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Global Scenarios for the 
Energy Infrastructure Development 
1. Summary 
 
The basic motivation for undertaking the development of alternative storylines about 
future diffusion of new energy infrastructures is the need for a transition of the global 
energy system toward (1) provision of affordable and reliable energy services for most 
of the global population and (2) protection of the environment at all scales from global 
to local. Another salient energy challenge that needs to be considered in this context is 
the issue of supply security. A complete paradigm change is required for this transition 
to take place. An important dimension of this change is the development and 
widespread deployment of hydrogen and electricity systems toward zero-emissions 
energy systems. Such a transition toward a hydrogen and electricity (hydricity) age is 
consistent with the historical evolution of global energy system.  
 
It is consistent with a pervasive decarbonization of energy end use from exclusive 
dependence on carbon-intensive energy carriers such as direct use of coal and biomass 
toward liquid energy carriers, electricity and energy gases. These developments of 
energy end use also reflect similar changes in the nature of energy supply. Primary 
energy structure has decarbonized as well, from reliance on traditional energy sources 
and coal toward ever-larger shares of oil, gas, nuclear and modern renewables.  
 
Energy gases have an especially important role as they offer the possibility of grid-
oriented and very convenient energy carriers, ranging from syngases to methane and 
hydrogen. They complement electricity as the other grid-oriented and also very 
convenient energy carrier. A further shift toward energy gases and electricity and 
eventually also toward the hydricity age is consistent with increasing quality and 
flexibility of energy carriers, higher security and better environmental protection. It is 
also consistent with increasing share of grid-oriented energy carriers reaching the 
consumer today in the more affluent parts of the world primarily as natural gas and 
electricity. All of such future changes will necessitate development of pervasive energy 
infrastructures. Some of these infrastructures may be global and integrated, others more 
local and regional. 
 
What is fundamentally new about the current dependence on  fossil energy sources is 
that for the first time humanity is in the position to irreversibly interfere in the planetary 
processes from ecosphere to climate change. This is a reason why the Nobel laureate 
Paul Crutzen suggested the present era be called Anthropocene (Steffen et al., 2004a 
and 2004b). Here again energy gases and hydrogen jointly with electricity hold the 
promise of bridging the challenge of both higher quality of energy services and minimal 
environmental burdens. The essential advantage is the hydricity technologies could 
offer future energy systems with zero carbon emissions provided that both electricity 
and hydrogen are produced from hydrocarbons with carbon capture and storage or from 
other sources of energy such as nuclear and new renewables. 
 
The main challenge in describing possible evolutionary or more abrupt paths toward the 
hydricity age is that this transition is likely to occur on the scale of a century or longer. 
The basic scenario is that electricity and energy gases, first natural gas and later 
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hydrogen, would gradually replace solid and liquid fuels. Hydrogen, while making 
inroads before 2050, would predominate only beyond and become the main energy 
carrier toward the end of the century. Even if a full transition toward the age of 
hydricity is achieved, there are many possible development paths from the present 
toward this distant future, there are many alternative energy systems that convert 
primary energy sources to emissions-free hydricity carriers, from fossils in conjunction 
with carbon capture and storage, to nuclear and new renewables.1 
 
The future is inherently unpredictable. The challenge in developing scenarios and their 
narratives is to provide a “grand logic” how major developments toward hydricity age 
might take place, what are their implications for policies and measures, what are other 
salient enabling developments and so on. Here we choose two basic narratives to tell 
two alternative stories of future transitions toward the hydricity age. They differ in 
numerous ways but we will provide some quantitative illustrations of their concurrences 
and differences. They are not merely two branches of one possible future but two fully 
alternative development paths with some shared characteristics. For example, we 
assume different rates of economic and social development, different institutional and 
geopolitical characteristics, alternative directions of research and development of new 
technologies as well as different technological investments and priorities, different 
future resource endowments (to a degree a function of technology), lifestyles, dietary 
preferences, settlement patterns and so on. Clearly, it will not be possible to outline in 
detail all of these different developments in this kind of an overview report, but we will 
try to provide salient illustrations of both the narrative and quantitative characteristics of 
the two narratives. 
 
There are also important similarities and concurrences in the two storylines. They share 
a common demographic development characterized with a successful transition toward 
low fertility rates, both represent affluent future worlds with adequate and affordable 
provision of energy services for virtually all. Finally, both assume sufficient investment 
in innovations and their diffusion so as to empower the transition toward new 
development paths leading toward the hydricity age.  
 
One of the two storylines, simply called A1H&E, specifies more emphasis on the 
centralized energy conversion, distribution and end-use patterns. It is an urbanized 
world with much of the land “given back” to the nature. Humanity is concentrated 
predominantly in large urban corridors and mega-settlement patterns. Current examples 
would be the Tokyo-Osaka corridor, the Ruhr cluster in Europe, the eastern seaboard in 
the US and many of the main mega-cities in the developing parts of the world ranging 
from Delhi, Beijing and Mexico City to Sao Paolo. Such settlement patterns could 
emerge in the future across the Trans-Siberian Corridor and elsewhere in Asia, Africa 
and Latin America. They may become more focused in the “North” today but are not all 
that likely to expand massively due to the aging and declining population trends. 
A1H&E storyline implies massive infrastructural developments in particular in the now 
developing parts of the world. In the energy area this implies development of large 
sources of primary energy, integrated grids from electricity and pipelines to cryogenic 
                                                 
1  Strictly speaking, there will be some residual emissions from practically any energy system. For 
example, carbon capture is never complete and storage can leak, many renewables such as biomass, 
hydropower and geothermal lead so some greenhouse gas emissions, while all energy systems lead at 
least indirectly to some emissions, e.g. because of the cement demand and possible also some fossil 
energy needs on the total life-cycle basis. 
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networks for energy gases. Most of the conversion and transformation would be central 
providing very flexible and environmentally benign structures of energy end use. 
Lifestyles are likely to change fundamentally in this future world as time progresses, 
especially toward the end of the century, but this version of the hydricity age story is in 
principle consistent with current lifestyles and settlement patterns of the most affluent 
parts of the world. 
 
The other storyline, simply called B1H&E, specifies more emphasis on decentralized 
energy conversion, distribution and energy end-use patterns. The world is also more 
urbanized than today but the patterns are assumed to be fundamentally different. They 
would be more consistent with widespread of urban sprawl into smaller settlements and 
communities. These are also interconnected through sophisticated infrastructures, but 
are fundamentally more autonomous and autarkical. The scenario places great emphasis 
on environmental protection at all scales, from local to global. It is representative of a 
successful implementation of sustainability together with a more equitable society. This 
implies that there is a substantial degree of income redistribution in space and time 
(another important maxim of the sustainability transition). As such, the scenario 
illustrates a complete paradigm change compared to current inequalities and 
environmental destruction. Another salient aspect of this scenario is the implicit change 
in lifestyle and social priorities. 
 
The two scenarios both draw on current tendencies in the world. They merely amplify 
these tendencies in different directions. A1H&E toward vigorous economic 
development that leads to leapfrogging of those left behind today, but also 
unprecedented affluence of the rich. It is associated with high rates of capital turnover, 
generous investment in research and innovations, infrastructures, education, cultural 
values and social security for the less privileged. B1H&E amplifies current tendencies 
toward stronger environmental awareness and harmony with nature, on global 
redistribution of income toward higher equity, decentralized governance and 
sustainability across all scales. They both also include elements of each other. In a 
nutshell, the difference is in emphasis. Nevertheless, they lead to alternative 
development paths toward the hydricity age and to fundamentally different future 
energy systems and end-use patterns. 
 
This translates in important characteristics of the future energy systems and hydricity 
age. Both scenarios outline a paradigm shift toward massive decarbonization. A1H&E 
achieves this transition through integrated infrastructures and centralize energy supply 
with vigorous conversions systems and trade across the globe.  B1H&E relies more on 
decentralized energy generation and end use. A1H&E is more consistent with large-
scale systems such as continental and global hydricity grids, decarbonization of fossil 
energy sources and geological carbon storage, nuclear power and centralized hydricity 
generation from large-scale renewables such as wind and solar. B1-H&B is more 
consistent with community-scale energy systems based on local renewable sources and 
more modest decarbonization of fossil energy sources as well as small nuclear facilities 
without a full fuel cycle. However, both scenarios include all options, none has a “silver 
bullet” that resolves all energy challenges. 
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2. Purposes of Scenarios 
 
2.1. What are Scenarios? 
 
Scenarios are descriptions of possible future developments. They are visions of how 
main driving forces underlying the salient future developments might evolve and 
interact with each. They are also visions of what such developments might imply about 
possible future states and how the near-term decisions might affect these. Scenarios are 
context specific. How they are developed and used depends very much on what the 
main purpose is and what are the main questions they are intended to inform. Our main 
question and purpose of the two hydricity storylines is seemingly simple: How do two 
alternative development paths toward hydricity age look like and how might they be 
achieved (Nakicenovic et al., 2000). 
 
Future is inherently unknown. Scenarios cannot be and are not predictions of future 
developments. Hydricity storylines are not projections of past trends either. Instead, 
they describe possible futures. Often scenarios come as a set of alternatives. Here we 
outline two storylines.  
 
Another purpose of the scenarios is to provide a framework for decision-making and to 
help illuminate the impacts associated with alternative courses of action. Scenarios 
facilitate the interpretation of possible consequences of these actions on future states.  
 
A further important characteristic of the scenarios is that they often include elements of 
future developments that cannot be formally modeled. For example, in the energy area 
they may specify lifestyle changes that comprise still a very elusive element in models. 
In many cases, the scenarios systematically follow through a number of assumptions 
and assess implications of policies and measures currently discussed by decision-makers 
around the world. Finally, perhaps the most important element of scenarios is that they 
challenge the prevailing mindsets. 
 
There are many definitions of scenarios in the literature. They differ a lot depending on 
the purpose of the scenarios and how they were developed. For example, the Special 
Report on Emissions Scenarios (SRES, Nakicenovic et al., 2000) by the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) defines a scenario as a plausible 
description of how future might develop, based on a coherent and internally consistent 
set of assumptions (“scenario logic”) about the key relationships and driving forces (e.g. 
rate of technology changes or prices). 
 
Generally, the scenarios do not attempt to describe all possible futures that can be 
imagined. Alternative scenario paths are developed to provide plausible answers to the 
major uncertainties and focal questions about the future of socioecological systems. In 
this particular case, we consider two related, but alternative development paths that 
might lead toward the (hydrogen and electricity) hydricity age. We do not consider all 
possible future development paths that might lead to a wider role of hydricity 
technologies and systems. Instead, we consider two alternative futures; one with more 
emphasis on decentralized systems and the other with more emphasis on centralized 
ones. They differ in emphasis and do not mutually exclude each other. Rather, they 
amplify differently some of the common development tendencies. They are stylized and 
not fully quantified. 
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2.2. Types of Scenarios 
 
Scenarios range from quantitative ones developed by models to narrative stories. Figure 
2.1 illustrates this continuum of different scenarios in the underlying literature. 
Recently, a major methodological advance in scenario formulation process includes 
approaches that integrate narrative stories with quantitative model-based analysis. The 
hydricity storylines were developed in the context of this major advance in the 
methodology of scenario analysis. Here we focus on two narrative stories of how 
hydricity age might emerge. They are modified version of two storylinespresented in the 
Special Report on Emissions Scenarios (SRES, Nakicenovic et al., 2000) by the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). The original IPCC scenarios 
include four storylines and alternative model quantifications of these storylines that 
resulted in 40 scenarios. 
 
 
Models
Stories
Scenarios
  
Figure 2.1: Schematic illustration of alternative scenario formulations, from narrative 
storylines to quantitative formal models. Source: Nakicenovic et al., 2000. 
 
Figure 2.2 shows a typology for assessment based on the distinction made by Rayner 
and Malone (1988) between descriptive social science research based on an analysis of 
mostly quantitative energy and material flows, and interpretive social science, focused 
on the values, meaning, and motivations of human agents (Rayner and Malone 1988; 
see also Robinson and Timmerman 1993). The figure further distinguishes between 
more global and more local analysis, and attempts to indicate typical forms of analysis 
that correspond to the four quadrants thus identified. The distinctions among the 
quadrants shown in Figure 2.2 underlie many of the problems of interdisciplinary 
communication and analysis in the sciences. It is well known that it is difficult to 
combine, for example, interpretive place-based analysis of human motivations with, say, 
a quantitative analysis of energy systems and emissions. For example, it has been 
notoriously difficult to include life-style changes in the evolution of energy end use and 
services. Much of the early work in the climate and energy fields, whether global or 
local, was located on the descriptive side of the typology. 
 
It is particularly noteworthy therefore, that recent developments in scenario analysis are 
beginning to bridge this difficult gap (Morita et al. 2001, Swart et al., 2004, and 
Millennium Ecosystems Assessment scenarios (MA, 2005). Over the past decade, the 
global scenario analysis community has begun to combine the primarily qualitative and 
narrative-based scenario analyses undertaken by Royal Dutch/Shell and other 
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companies (Wack 1985a; Wack 1985b; Schwartz 1992), with global modeling work in 
the form of analyses that combine the development of detailed narrative storylines with 
their “quantification” in various global models (Raskin et al., 1998; Nakicenovic et al., 
2000). For example, the SRES (Nakicenovic et al. 2000) work, undertaken for the 
IPCC, cut across the interpretive/descriptive divide (See Figure 2.2), though still 
focusing mainly on the global and regional level. As illustrated in Figure 2.1, the 
hydricity storylines also cuts across the divide between interpretive and descriptive 
research by combining narrative storylines and quantitative modeling. The hydricity 
storylines are rooted in the original SRES ones.  
 
 
Global     
modeling
Regional     
science
Global     
storylines
Place-based     
case studies
Interpretive
Descriptive
Local Global
 
Figure 2.2: Analytical typology of scenarios analysis. This figure illustrates local and 
global scenarios exercises that are more based on interpretive, qualitative or 
descriptive storyline-based approaches. Source: Nakicenovic et al., 2005. 
 
Another new development in scenarios is to reach across the global/local gap, with a 
stronger focus on local analysis of energy systems and services or ecosystems and its 
services (e.g. Carpenter et al., 2005). This could be accomplished in future assessments 
of hydricity systems and their emergence by incorporating information from sub-global 
assessments (e.g., for Europe, North America or Asia) in the global scenario effort and 
vice versa. Also, a few methodological improvements could be explored by linking 
and/or nesting the development of the local, regional, and global scenarios. Linking and 
nesting different scale scenario exercises will be a field that needs further exploration in 
the future. In this way, the future work on hydricity storylines could contribute to the 
trend toward more integrated and more interdisciplinary work on the relationships 
among human and natural systems. The hydricity storylines presented in this study are 
primarily global, but the next step in the development of the storylines and the fully-
fledged scenarios could go one step further in the direction of developing multi-scale 
scenarios, both in time and space. 
 
 
2.3. Hydricity Storylines 
 
Figure 2.3 demonstrates the place of the hydricity storylines along two axis describing 
the geographical scale of work and the degree to which the scenarios are based on 
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interpretive, qualitative storylines or grounded in model-based descriptions. The 
hydricity scenarios combine the storyline approach with a previous quantification of the 
original SRES scenarios. The storylines have been conceived and developed to provide 
insights into a broad range of potential future energy-systems changes. The objective 
was to portray plausible developments that are internally consistent, rather than those 
that may be considered to be desirable on undesirable. The idea of what is “negative” or 
“positive” in any given scenario and its associated storyline is inherently dependent on 
the eye of the beholder and thus highly subjective. Clearly, hydricity technologies hold 
the promise of many benefits (positive) and the tread of many dangers and risks 
(negative). Therefore great attention was given in this study to present both positive and 
negative aspects in the storylines. Uniting only “positive” or “negative” features in a 
scenario would result in homogeneous and "uni-dimensional" futures that may not be 
plausible and consistent. We have refrained from setting up either of the two storylines 
as either positive or negative. Instead, elements of both are present in the two storylines. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.3: Illustrative placement of hydricity storylines in analytical typology given in 
Figure 2.2. The storylines are primarily interpretive and qualitative but are rooted in 
the descriptive and quantitative SRES scenario families. They give little local and 
regional context and focus primarily on global developments. Source: Based on 
Nakicenovic et al., 2005. 
It can be argued that the narrative storylines are richer than quantitative scenarios 
(whether model based or not) in the sense that they can provide seemingly seamless 
connections across multitudes of scales, but compared to numerical and analytical 
models, they are not quantitative and do not provide reproducibility under varying 
assumptions about main driving forces. 
 
The combination of narrative storylines and their quantification in integrated scenarios 
of alternative futures is the main method for capturing complexity and uncertainty and 
transcending limits of conventional deterministic models of change. The hydricity 
storylines address a highly complex set of interactions between human and natural 
systems, a scientific challenge that is compounded by the cumulative and long-term 
character of the phenomena. While the world of many decades from now is 
indeterminate, storyline-based scenarios offer a structured means of organizing 
information and gleaning insight into the possibilities. Scenarios can draw on both 
science and imagination to articulate a spectrum of plausible visions of the future and 
Interpretive
Descriptive
Local Global
Hyd
rici
ty 
Sto
ryli
nes
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pathways of development. Some characteristics of the hydricity scenarios are assumed 
to evolve gradually and continuously from current social, economic, and environmental 
patterns and trends; others deviate in fundamental ways. A long-term view of a 
multiplicity of future possibilities is required in order to be able to consider the ultimate 
risks of maintaining adequate energy services, assess critical interactions with other 
aspects of human, technological and environmental systems, and guide policy responses 
(MA, 2005). 
The development of methods to effectively blend quantitative and qualitative insights is 
at the frontier of scenarios research today. The narrative storylines give voice to 
important qualitative factors shaping development such as values, behaviors, and 
institutions, providing a broader perspective than is possible by analytical and numerical 
modeling alone. Storylines are rich in detail, texture, metaphors, and possible insights, 
while quantitative analysis offers structure, discipline, rigor, and reproducibility. The 
most relevant recent efforts are those that have sought to balance these attributes. They 
provide important insights into how current tendencies and trends might become 
amplified in different future worlds across the four storylines and provide a multitude of 
different details across scales and systems. They are embedded in extensive assessment 
of the main driving forces and their future developments across scenarios in the 
literature. 
 
Multiple futures are fundamental to any scenario enterprise, because prediction of 
complex and evolving systems is not possible. They are required for indicating the 
range of plausible futures and for encompassing some of the deep uncertainties 
associated with the evolution of complex systems. Examples of deep uncertainties are 
non-linear responses of complex systems, emerging properties and path dependencies, 
and generally unpredictable behavior that emerges due to branching points, bifurcations, 
and complex temporal and spatial dynamics. Complex systems are inherently 
unpredictable, especially when human response strategies that have yet to be defined are 
involved. It is likely that the long-term evolution of energy as one of many complex 
systems shaping our future will unfold in unexpected ways and will embody important 
surprises. Such surprises could include unexpected emergent properties, path 
dependencies, and the crossing of critical thresholds, leading to irreversibilities.  
The overall time horizon of the hydricity age reaches well beyond 2050. This is the case 
because of sheer inertia of the global energy system. It will remain to be predominately 
fossil based over many decades to come. The shift toward more convenient and less 
polluting energy carriers is likely to be an equally long process. Thus, long time 
horizons are required to encompass fundamental changes in anthropogenic, 
technological and ecological systems and their interactions. Interaction with many Earth 
systems across different scales might involve even longer time periods. These processes 
certainly have time scales much longer than a century. It can be argued that some 
aspects of technological and social systems also need much longer time frames; the 
hydricity era might be initiated during the 21st century as indicated by the two 
storylines, but it would certainly not denote the dominant paradigm and if it ever does 
than most likely only toward the end of the century.  
Given the modest modeling techniques available today (especially in the area of 
integrated assessment), development of a rich set of alternative scenarios is the main 
method used to encompass these different possibilities and the associated uncertainties. 
This approach is also followed in the two hydricity storylines. In addition to the 
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quantitative formulation of many of the alternative scenario characteristics with a set of 
six integrated assessment models (IAM) in the original SRES scenarios, the two 
hydricity storylines have elaborate narratives that extend beyond the scenario 
quantifications and extend across a multitude of levels and scales. They provide the 
background information about the main driving direct forces, the associated 
fundamental drivers, and their consequences.  
 
3. Storylines and Scenarios 
 
3.1. SRES Storylines and Scenarios 
 
The two hydricity storylines, and especially their quantifications, are deeply rooted in 
two of the four SRES scenario families. The SRES emissions scenarios are based on an 
internally consistent and reproducible set of assumptions about the key relationships and 
driving forces of change, derived from the analysis of both historical developments and 
the current situation. The SRES scenarios consist of both qualitative and quantitative 
components; they have narrative storylines and a number of corresponding quantitative 
scenarios for each storyline developed by six different IAMs (Nakicenovic et al., 2000). 
This way the four storylines multiplied into 40 emissions scenarios. In addition, a set of 
scenarios that lead to the stabilization of atmospheric carbon concentrations have been 
developed for the IPCC Third Assessment Report (TAR). They were derived by nine 
different IAMs (Morita et al., 2001) for different stabilization levels leading to some 80 
distinct stabilization scenarios.  
 
Here we have extended two of the SRES storylines to incorporate two alternative paths 
toward the hydricity age. This involved extensions of the original storylines to include 
the emergence of the hydricity age. The new storylines build also on some of the SRES 
scenarios (based on different models). The primary quantifications are those of 
stabilization scenarios. The reason is simply that climate mitigation requires drastic 
decarbonization of energy and hydricity technologies are some of the most important 
options to achieve this. 
 
The SRES scenarios are descriptive and were not intended to be prescriptive. Even the 
stabilization cases do not prescribe specific mitigation policies but rather assess what 
measures would be required to achieve drastic reduction of emissions. They are neither 
desirable nor undesirable in their own right. Thus, they are consistent with the notion 
that scenarios need not be generally “positive” or “negative”. They have been built as 
descriptions of plausible alternative futures, rather than preferred, developments. The 
same characteristics have been incorporated in the two hydricity storylines. 
 
The SRES scenarios are grouped into four scenario families (simply called A1, A2, B1, 
and B2). Each family differs with respect to many of its main driving forces and the 
resulting characteristics ranging from the demographic, economic, technological 
development patterns and pathways to the resulting energy requirements and emissions. 
Figure 3.1 gives a schematic illustration of the four scenario families, very 
simplistically, as branches of a two-dimensional tree. In reality, the four scenario 
families share a space of a much higher dimensionality given the numerous assumptions 
needed to define any given scenario in a particular modeling approach. The schematic 
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diagram illustrates that the scenarios build on the main driving forces of GHG 
emissions. Each scenario family is based on a common specification of some of the 
main driving forces. 
 
Box: History of SRES Scenarios 
 
In 1992, IPCC developed a set of six emissions scenarios. In 1996, after evaluating 
the usefulness of the 1992 scenarios (Alcamo et al., 1995), the IPCC decided to 
develop a new set of emissions scenarios, the SRES scenarios (Nakicenovic et al., 
2000), which are used as baseline scenarios in developing the hydricity storylines. 
 
The SRES writing team developed 40 individual scenarios based on an extensive 
literature assessment, based on six alternative modeling approaches, and an “open 
process” that solicited wide participation and feedback. They cover a wide range of 
the main demographic, technological and economic driving forces for GHG and 
sulfur emissions. These scenarios do not include explicit mitigation measures or 
policies (additional climate policy initiatives), although they necessarily encompass 
various policies of other types, some of which have the effect of reducing 
emissions. In TAR, IPCC developed an additional set of 80 concentrations 
stabilization scenarios based on SRES. They include a wide spectrum of emissions 
mitigation measures and polices. 
 
Each scenario links one of four narrative “storylines” with one particular 
quantitative model interpretation. All the scenarios based on a specific storyline 
constitute a scenario “family”. The following Box summarizes four narrative 
storylines, which describe driving forces of SRES scenarios and their relationships. 
Each storyline represent the playing out of different social, economic, technological 
and environmental developments (or paradigms), which may be viewed positively 
by some people and negatively by others. Possible “surprise” and “disaster” 
scenarios were excluded.  
 
Six different models, AIM, ASF, IMAGE, MARIA, MESSAGE-MACRO and 
MiniCAM were used to develop 40 SRES scenarios. These models are representative of 
different modeling approaches ranging from macroeconomic to systems-engineering 
models and different integrated assessment frameworks in the literature such as those 
that focus more on land-use and other more on energy systems changes. Table 3.1 
summarizes the main demographic, economic and energy driving forces for A1T and 
B1T SRES scenarios with MESSAGE IAM that provide the basis for the two hydricity 
storylines, A1H&E and B1H&E. These drive the energy-systems and land-use changes 
that are the major sources of GHG emissions. 
 
Table 3.1 indicates that the two scenarios share almost identical population projections 
that lead to about nine billion by 2050 and declines to below eight billion people by 
2100. Both scenarios lead to very high rates of economic development leading to 
conditional catch-up of the developing parts. It is noteworthy that rapid development 
leads to a high rate of capital turnover in both scenarios. This means that most efficient 
technologies replace older vintages leading to high rates of energy efficiency 
improvement especially in the end use (e.g. final energy intensity) and thus relatively 
low levels of primary energy requirements. Generally, scenario A1 portrays higher rates 
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of growth and energy efficiency improvement, while scenario B1 leads to more drastic 
change of lifestyles and human behavior toward energy efficiency improvements. 
Table 3.1: Overview of main scenario driving forces in 2020, 2050 and 2100. Numbers 
show the main driving forces of A1T-MESSAGE and B1T-MESSAGE scenarios that 
provide the basis for the two hydricity storylines A1H&E and B1H&E. Units are given 
in the table. Source: Nakicenovic et al., 2000. 
 1990 A1T B1T 
Population (billion) 5.3  
  2020  7.6 7.6 
  2050  8.7 8.7 
  2100  7.1 7.7 
World GDP (1012 1990US$) 21   
  2020  57 52 
  2050  187 136 
  2100  550 290 
Income ratio North to South 
(Annex-I to Non-Annex-I) 
16.1   
  2020  6.4 8.1 
  2050  2.8 3.4 
  2100  1.7 1.5 
Final energy intensity 
(106J/US$)a 
16.7   
  2020  8.7 8.6 
  2050  4.8 4.5 
  2100  2.3 1.4 
Primary energy (1018 J)a 351   
  2020  649 583 
  2050  1213 516 
  2100      2021 714 
 
 
These are two out of 40 SRES scenarios that represent “successful” future development 
path. They provide a good platform for the two hydricity storylines both because rapid 
development is based on vigorous diffusion of new technologies and frequent capital 
turnover. This propensity to innovate is consistent with possible emergence of a 
hydrogen economy in the distant future. 
 
In contrast to these two scenarios, the compete set of all 40 SRES scenarios cover most 
of the range of carbon dioxide, other GHG, and sulfur emissions found in the recent 
scenario literature. A1 and B1 scenarios are in the lower range of population growth, 
higher range of economic development rates as well as energy improvement rates. 
 
Appendix 1a and b summarizes main demographic, technological, social and economic 
driving forces across the SRES scenarios and the resulting GHG and sulfur emissions of 
the scenarios at 1990, 2020, 2050, and 2100 year. CO2 emissions in A1 are highest in 
growth rate in the first quarter of the 21st century, peak at the middle of the century in 
terms of absolute emission levels, and then decrease toward 2100. In A2, CO2 emissions 
are in the middle of the range of scenarios in the first half of 21 century, but become 
very high in the latter half of the century. In the B1 world, CO2 emissions decline after 
the second quarter of the 21st century even without any climate policy, and this scenario 
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family has the lowest emission levels in the latter half of the century. CO2 emissions in 
B2 world are lowest in the first half of the 21st century, but continue to increase in the 
second half, and the emissions reach a similar level to that in A1 in 2100. 
 
 
Box: The main characteristics of the four SRES storylines and scenario 
families. Storylines A1 and B1 are used as the basis for the hydrogen and 
electricity narratives in this report. 
 
  The A1 storyline and scenario family describes a future world of very rapid 
economic growth, low population growth and rapid introduction of new and more 
efficient technology. Major underlying themes are convergence among regions, 
capacity building and increased cultural and social interaction, with a substantial 
reduction in regional differences in per capita income.  
  The A2 storyline and scenario family describes a very heterogeneous world. 
The underlying theme is self-reliance and preservation of local identities. Fertility 
patterns across regions converge very slowly, resulting in high population growth. 
Economic development is primarily regionally-oriented, and per capita economic 
growth and technological change are more fragmented and slow compared to other 
storylines. 
  The B1 storyline and scenario family describes a convergent world with rapid 
change in economic structures toward a service and information economy, 
reduction in material intensity and the introduction of clean and resource-efficient 
technologies. The emphasis is on global solutions to economic, social and 
environmental sustainability, including improved equity, but without additional 
climate initiatives. 
  The B2 storyline and scenario family describes a world in which the emphasis is 
on local solutions to economic, social, and environmental sustainability. It is a 
world with less rapid, and more diverse technological change, but with a strong 
emphasis on community initiative and social innovation to find local and regional 
solutions. While policies are also oriented towards environmental protection and 
social equity, they are focused on local and regional levels. 
 
With its high rate of economic growth, futures in the A1 family generate great pressures 
on the energy resource base.  As a result, this set of scenarios has a particularly large 
level of uncertainty with regard to the future directions of technological progress in 
general and especially in the energy field. This is the reason why the A1 scenario family 
is divided into three scenario groups that are each based on alternative directions of 
technological change in the energy system: A1FI, A1T and A1B scenario groups. 
 
The A1FI scenario group is fossil-fuel intensive and includes two fossil fuel dominated 
alternatives: A1C (coal intensive) and A1G (oil and gas intensive). A1C scenarios are 
based on “clean coal” technologies that are generally environmentally friendly with 
exception of the fact that they have high GHG emissions. A1G scenarios describe “oil- 
and gas-rich” futures, with a swift transition from conventional resources to abundant 
unconventional resources including methane clathrates (hydrates). The A1T scenario 
group (“new-energy technology” – intensive) is characterized by rapid development of 
solar and nuclear technologies on the supply side and fuel cells used in energy end-use 
applications. A1B is balanced across all energy sources. ‘Balanced’ is defined as not 
relying too heavily on one particular energy source and incorporates the assumption that 
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similar improvement rates apply to all energy supplies and end-use technologies. The 
“snowflake” diagram in Figure 3.2 indicates the ranges of the main driving forces and 
the resulting emissions across scenarios sharing the A1 storyline. 
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Figure 3.1:  Schematic illustration of SRES scenarios. The four scenario “families” are 
illustrated, very simplistically, as branches of a two-dimensional tree.  In reality, the 
four scenario families share a space of a much higher dimensionality given the 
numerous assumptions needed to define any given scenario in a particular modeling 
approach.  The schematic diagram illustrates that the scenarios build on the main 
driving forces of GHG emissions. Source: Nakicenovic et al., 2000. 
 
The A2 scenario family represents a differentiated world with high population growth, 
relatively slow GDP per capita growth, relatively high energy use, and slow 
technological change. The high population growth leads to some 14 billion people by 
the end of the century. This is expected to create many pressures worldwide especially 
during the coming decades and present an obstacle to development. For example, 
ASIA’s population would continue to grow throughout the 21st century, exceeding 7 
billion by 2100. More recent high population scenarios are significantly lower, 
especially in Asia, resulting in global populations of some 12 billion. This kind of high 
population growth resulting from a delayed fertility transition would, combined with the 
internationally more fragmented economic and technological outlook result in 
comparatively modest income levels (below $10,000 per capita by 2100). Energy use, 
while lower than in the A1 scenario family would nonetheless remain comparatively 
high, exceeding with 470 EJ current global energy use by 2100. Figure 3.2 indicates the 
ranges of the main driving forces and the resulting emissions across scenarios sharing 
the A2 storyline. 
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Figure 3.2: Global cumulative CO2 emissions in the A1 and A2 scenarios and their 
main driving forces. The minimum, maximum and median (50th percentile) values shown 
on the six axes of each hexagon, for the cumulative energy and land-us CO2 emissions 
from 1990 to 2100 and 2100 values for the four driving forces, are based on the 
distribution of scenarios in the literature. Source: Nakicenovic et al., 2000. 
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Figure 3.3: Global cumulative CO2 emissions in the B1 and B2 scenarios and their 
main driving forces. The minimum, maximum and median (50th percentile) values shown 
on the six axes of each hexagon, for the cumulative energy and land-us CO2 emissions 
from 1990 to 2100 and 2100 values for the four driving forces, are based on the 
distribution of scenarios in the literature. Source: Nakicenovic et al., 2000. 
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The B1 scenario family describes a world with low population growth, rapid changes in 
economic structures toward a service and information economy, reduction in material 
intensity and the introduction of clean and resource-efficient technologies, paraphrasing 
an overall sustainable development theme. Population developments would be similar to 
the A1 scenario family, however combined with drastically lowered resource use (some 
200 EJ primary energy use by 2100). Incomes are very high, but lower compared to A1 
scenario family. However, B1 is much more equitable world with high levels of 
international collaboration and solidarity and unprecedented levels of environmental 
awareness. This results in very low adverse interferences with Earth systems. The B1 
scenarios are more sustainable than those of the other three families. The “snowflake” 
diagram in Figure 3.3 indicates the ranges of the main driving forces and the resulting 
emissions across scenarios sharing the B1 storyline. 
 
Finally, the B2 scenario family represents a world in which the emphasis is on local 
solution to economic, social and environmental sustainability. This world is 
characterized by moderate population growth, intermediate level of economic 
development and less rapid and more diverse technological change than in A1 and B1 
scenario storylines. Figure 3.3 indicates the ranges of the main driving forces and the 
resulting emissions across scenarios sharing the B2 storyline. 
 
The stabilization scenarios bear the same main scenario driving forces as the 
corresponding no-climate policy, “baseline” SRES scenarios, but differ in levels of 
energy demand and especially in their energy supply structures (and to a lesser extent 
also in land-use practices) as a result of emission constraints leading to a stabilization of 
atmospheric CO2 at alternative levels ranging between 450 to 750 ppmv. Some 80 
different stabilization (here called Post-SRES) scenarios were developed by nine 
different IAMs for IPCC TAR (Morita et al., 2001), all based on the 40 SRES baseline 
scenarios. Even though SRES scenarios include enormous technological advances and 
structural change in the energy system, the Post-SRES are characterized by even more 
fundamental paradigm change in the energy system toward zero emissions. This means 
that hydrogen and electricity have even larger roles in these scenarios compared to the 
SRES baselines. 
 
 
3.2. Energy Systems Structures in SRES Scenarios 
 
There are a number of energy challenges for the 21st century. As mentioned, the first 
challenge is that about one third of the global population, or some two billion people, do 
not have access to affordable and clean energy services and need to be “connected” to 
reliable and affordable sources of energy. These are often the same people who do not 
have access to clean water or sanitation and are, in general, deprived from adequate 
access to many other essential amenities. Because of the dangers of climate change, it 
follows that the access to energy services cannot be provided exclusively by now 
predominant ways of converting hydrocarbon sources into electricity and fuels.  
 
The second challenge is how developing countries can leapfrog some traditional 
development phases and directly adopt the newest practices and technologies.  This is 
exceptionally difficult to achieve in the view that technology adoption and diffusion is 
historically a long process, especially in the case of energy-related infrastructures.  
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Historically, it has taken between 20 years to half a century and more for new 
technologies to substitute the old ones.  In other words, time itself is a limited resource.   
 
A further challenge is finding the means to finance the energy investments that are 
required for achieving these transformations in a world where ODA (official 
development aid) and FDI (foreign direct investment) are already falling short of the 
development needs.  Total global investments in energy infrastructures and systems to 
achieve such a transition toward adequate provisioning of energy services is estimated 
at some $300 to 500 billion per year during the next 20 years (WEA, Goldemberg et al., 
2000). A substantial part of these large investment requirements would be for the 
development of energy infrastructures. The estimated investment requirements  
correspond to some ten percent of total global investment indicating again the 
magnitude of such a challenge. Finally, perhaps the biggest challenge from today’s 
perspective is how to combat the adverse impacts of energy systems across all scales, 
from local indoor air pollution all the way to climate change.  However, to achieve a 
sustainability transition, all of the above challenges need to be faced and resolved. 
 y gy
 
Figure 3.4: Global primary energy requirements since 1850 and in the IPCC SRES 
scenarios to 2100 in EJ per year. Source: Nakicenovic et al., 2000.  
 
Thus, a prerequisite for achieving further economic development in the world are 
adequate levels of energy services.  Figure 3.4 compares future energy requirements 
across a wide range of SRES scenarios (Nakicenovic et al., 2000) with the historical 
development.  Since the beginning of the industrial revolution, global primary energy 
has grown at about two percent per year. The SRES scenarios indicate a seven-fold 
increase in primary energy requirements at the high end of the scale and at least almost 
a two-fold increase at the low end.  What is interesting to note is that the scenarios in 
the lower range represent sustainable futures with a transition to very efficient energy 
use and high degrees of conservation that result in a radical departure from the current 
development paths.  Generally, these are also the scenarios in which energy sources 
with low carbon intensity play an important role leading to vigorous reduction of future 
GHG emissions. SRES scenarios in this lower part of the range include substantial 
decarbonization of the energy system and vigorous diffusion of electricity and 
hydrogen. 
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Figure 3.5 illustrates alternative energy systems structures across the range of scenarios.  
Relative shares of different energy sources, in percent, show the historical evolution of 
the global energy supply since the 1850s (Figure 3.5a).  The first transition of the 
energy system started with the introduction of coal that replaced traditional sources such 
as fuel wood and working animals.  This transition lasted about 70 years until the 1920s.  
During that time, the share of coal increased from 20 percent in 1850 to more than 60 
percent by 1920.  This development phase was characterized by the introduction of the 
age of steam, steal and railways.  The next transition lasted another 70 years and is 
characterized by the replacement of coal by oil and natural gas.  It can further be 
characterized by the rapid expansion of internal combustion, electricity, petrochemicals 
and the automobile.  By the 1990s, more than 80 percent of global energy was supplied 
by hydrocarbon sources, that is, coal, oil and natural gas.  Zero carbon sources such as 
hydropower and nuclear play only a limited role today, while traditional renewables 
supply the rest of the energy needs, especially in the developing countries.  
 Evolution of Global Primary Energy
a b
c d
 
Figure 3.5: Historical evolution of energy systems structures, as shares of different 
primary energy sources (a) and future developments in SRES MESSAGE A1T (b), A1B 
(c) and A1FI (d) scenarios. Source: Based on Nakicenovic et al., 2000. 
 
Looking into the future, different possibilities unfold across the SRES scenarios.  Some 
of the scenarios, and in particular A1FI group shown in Figure 3.5, foresee a return to 
coal (Figure 3.5d).  This is especially important for those regions of the world that have 
ample coal resources, e.g., India and China.  Other scenarios put more emphasis on 
stronger reliance on oil and gas (Figure 3.5c), while yet other scenarios, and in 
particular A1T and B1, foresee a transition toward zero carbon sources with a much 
stronger role being played by nuclear, solar, modern biomass and other renewable 
energy sources (Figure 3.5b).  The scenario shown in Figure 3.5b, in fact, would lead to 
a dominance of non-carbon energy sources by the end of the 21st century. 
 
The alternative developments of the energy systems structures in the future across the 
scenarios imply developing a whole host of new energy technologies, and have different 
implications, for example, for energy infrastructure developments. In particular, Figure 
3.5 has indicated a wide diversity of future energy systems structures, from a return to 
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wider use of (clean) coal in A1FI and A2 scenario families to a transition toward a 
larger role of zero-carbon sources of energy (renewables and nuclear) in A1T and B1 
scenario families. This large diversity across scenarios results in a wide range of carbon 
emissions. What is surprising however is that the structures of energy end use across all 
SRES scenarios are convergent. Figure 3.6 shows the shares of different final energy 
carriers across the scenarios. 
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Figure 3.6:  Global final energy shares (in percent) by form of delivery. Direct use of 
solids, direct use of liquids, and delivery of grids (gas, district heat, electricity, and 
hydrogen) for the four SRES marker scenarios. Overlapping shaded areas indicate 
variation across the four marker scenarios. Liquids includes oil products, methanol and 
ethanol. Solids includes coal and biomass. Source: Nakicenovic et al., 2000. 
 
In 1990, solid, liquid and grid-oriented energy carriers share roughly a third of all final 
energy in the world. The share of the solids decreases in all scenarios. Basically, the 
direct use of coal and biomass disappears. This brings many environmental benefits at 
all scales, in particular reducing the in-door air pollution that is responsible for high 
rates of mortality in now developing parts of the world. All solid sources of primary 
energy are converted to (clean) liquids, electricity or energy gases. This is also the case 
in the coal-intensive A1FI scenarios and biomass intensive A1T and B1 scenarios. The 
share of liquids stays roughly constant across most of the scenarios but there is 
increasing role of synliquids produced from biomass, coal and in some cases also 
natural gas. The grid-oriented energy carriers become energy forms of choice increasing 
across the whole range of so diverse futures and energy systems structures in SRES 
scenarios. Initially, the shares of electricity and energy gases (primarily natural gas) 
increase but later syngases become also important. Especially the role of hydrogen 
increases in many scenarios and in particular in A1T and B1. These developments imply 
both large R&D efforts and vigorous diffusion of new energy technologies including 
hydricity systems. Infrastructure demands are large especially in scenario with large role 
of grid-oriented energy carriers. 
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The Post-SRES mitigation scenarios further amply these tendencies toward larger shares 
of hydricity technologies beyond 2050. These scenarios include measures and policies 
to achieve atmospheric stabilization of GHG concentrations in accordance with the 
Article 2 of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC, 
1992). Most of the mitigation effort is directed toward the reduction of carbon emissions 
well below current levels to some two GtC per year toward the end of the century. A 
large part of the decarbonization measures involves a shift away from hydrocarbon 
sources of energy or carbon capture and storage. In both cases, the share of electricity 
and hydrogen in final energy increases. Below, we will discuss how large is the role of 
hydrogen in across SRES and Post-SRES scenarios. 
 
 
3.3. The Role of Hydricity Technologies 
 
The potential emergence of a hydricity age has spurred increasing interest from both the 
scientific and policy community as of recently encompassing all the range from 
optimistic to skeptical views (e.g. Rifkin, 2002, NAE, 2004). Nonetheless, the available 
scenario literature has to date been extremely sparse2 in sketching out possible diffusion 
scenarios of hydrogen technologies and associated investment requirements that could 
better guide technology R&D policies, especially under the additional “demand pull” of 
climate stabilization efforts.  
 
In order to better understand the role of hydrogen in future energy systems across SRES 
baseline scenarios and Post-SRES stabilization scenarios, we consider here B1T and 
A1T-450 scenarios because they have the highest share of hydrogen and electricity in 
final energy. In part, this is because the high-level of investment in new energy 
technologies paves the way for emergence of hydricity age and in part because 
stabilization of atmospheric carbon emissions induces vigorous decarbonization. Both 
of these development lead to high shares of hydrogen and electricity. Figure 3.7 shows 
the growing shares of hydrogen and electricity in these two scenarios and also the 
declining  importance of embodied hydrogen compared to pure hydrogen in final energy 
By embodiedhydrogen we refer to other energy carriers that either contain hydrogen 
such as other energy gases (e.g. methane) or other energy carriers produced from 
hydrogen  such as a part of generated electricity. 
 
Figure 3.7 shows that jointly hydricity forms of final energy are in the region of some 
90 percent in both scenarios by the end of the century. The share of pure hydrogen 
increases from a few percent today to between 20 and 30 percent by the end of the 
century. The share of embodied hydrogen declines. Thus, there is a substitution of pure 
hydrogen for embodied hydrogen. In other words, energy gases remain to be an 
important energy form but their structure changes from natural gas to ever more pure 
hydrogen. Hydrogen and electricity are mutually exchangeable energy “currencies” (or 
forms) and this is reflected in the share of electricity generated from hydrogen (and vice 
versa not shown in Figure 3.7). Thus, the total amount of hydrogen in all forms, pure 
and embodied in other energy forms(including electricity) and the total amount of 
                                                 
2 A notable exception is Barreto et al., 2003. However also this most valuable study focuses on aggregate 
global trends in a single (optimistic) scenario and therefore does not offer technology specific scenario 
reviews for ASIA for a wider range of baseline and stabilization scenarios. 
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electricity are increasing vigorously. 3  This evolutionary development in the two 
hydricity-rich SRES and Post-SRES scenarios gives an illustrative roadmap toward the 
hydricity age. 
 
Figure 3.7: Share of hydrogen and electricity in final energy in A1T-450 and B1T 
scenarios. Hydrogen is divided into pure (elemental) hydrogen and embodied hydrogen 
(in other energy forms such as natural gas). The legend below explains the five 
categories of hydrogen and electricity in the figure. 
*1)  Hydrogen (H2) in final energy. 
*2)  Hydrogen atoms embodied in fossil fuels and biomass in final energy. 
*3)  Hydrogen (H2) consumed to produce electricity by fuel cells. 
*4)  Hydrogen atoms embodied in fossil fuels and biomass to produce electricity. 
*5)  Share of electricity from nuclear and renewables without carbon nor hydrogen. 
 
Table 3.2 summarizes the growing role of hydrogen across all SRES and Post-SRES 
scenarios. Today, hydrogen production worldwide is in the range of some 6 EJ or 
merely about 1.5 percent of total global energy requirements. Most of this hydrogen is 
used for non-energy purposes and is produced through steam-reforming from natural 
gas. Table 3.1 indicates the vigorous growth of the role of hydrogen across the scenarios 
throughout the century. Basically, hydrogen increases from ten-fold to hundred-fold 
during the century. A hundred-fold increase puts global hydrogen requirements 50 
percent above the total primary energy requirements today! This is indeed a strong 
indication that the hydricity age does emerge in some of the scenarios – particularly in 
A1T and B1T. 
 
Table 3.2. The role of hydrogen across SRES baseline scenarios and Post-SRES 
stabilization scenarios, in EJ per year. 
                                    Range 
 1990 2020 2050 2100 
Use of hydrogen, EJ per year 
Baseline 6   7.1 – 16.1         25.7 – 162.0       65.3 – 698.1 
Stabilization 6   7.7 – 13.1         26.1 – 150.8      208.2 – 580.8 
                                                 
3 This refers to total embodied and pure hydrogen in energy end use and implies for example that some of 
the embodied hydrogen reaches consumers as natural gas or electricity. However, this does not represent 
double counting of final energy but is rather intended to better indicate the growing importance of 
hydrogen in energy end use. 
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4. Hydricity Storylines 
 
One of the hydricity storylines, simply called A1H&E, is primarily based on the A1 
storyline with addition of strong emphasis on decarbonization as illustrated by the A1T-
450 and 550 scenarios, two mitigation variants of A1T subgroup that leads to 
stabilization of atmospheric concentrations at between 450 and 550 ppmv (compared to 
280 ppmv pre-industrial levels about the 1800s and current levels of some 380 ppm) 
toward the 2150s. An important characteristic adopted in the A1H&E storyline is the 
rapidly growing need for energy services especially across highly urbanized world 
beyond 2050. In conjunction with rapid decarbonization, this leads to development of 
extensive and massive energy (and other) infrastructures and most importantly for the 
hydricity age, the widespread diffusion of carbon-free, grid-oriented energy carriers, 
electricity and hydrogen, and of centralized conversion systems. As was shown, the 
A1T-550 scenarios already includes very rapid deployment of hydrogen as an important 
future energy carrier. The main difference is that in A1H&E hydricity forms become the 
energy carriers of choice. 
 
The other hydricity storyline, simply called B1H&E, is based on the environmentally 
oriented B1 scenario family that achieves most of the criteria associated with the 
sustainability transition. This sustainable world is primarily renewable with high, but 
not excessive growth rates. It is also a very equitable world with a high and universal 
decarbonization of energy. This also promotes hydricity technologies. However, many 
of the systems are generally more decentralized and community oriented. The storyline 
does not necessarily imply the development of global and perhaps not even continental 
scale infrastructures. Energy systems are interconnected but not highly integrated. The 
emphasis is on local (on-site) conversion and end use. The role of hydricity technologies 
is large and associated with vigorous growth also in this storyline. The difference is that 
both electricity and hydrogen are produced more in a decentralized fashion and used 
more locally. As was also shown, the B1T scenario on which the B1H&E storyline I 
based already includes very rapid deployment of hydrogen and an important energy 
carrier. As in the case of A1H&E, the main difference is that in B1H&E hydricity forms 
become the energy carriers of choice. 
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Table 4.1. Major Characteristics of the Two Storylines. 
 A1H&E B1H&E 
Description “High Growth”, “Technopolis”, “Rich 
& Clean”, “Unlimited Skies”, 
“Affluent”, “Centralized”,  “Business 
Class” 
“Sustainable”, “Technogarden”, “Green & 
Clean”, “Down to Earth”, “Equitable”, 
“Decentralized”, “Chat Room” 
World view Technology-intensive hydricity scenario
Rapid technological progress 
Globalization of economy and lifestyles
Convergence among regions and 
relative development catch up.  
Market-based solutions, strong 
institutions, liberal government 
regulations and high investments 
Green and sustainable hydricity scenario 
Global solutions toward social equity and 
environmental sustainability 
Harmonization in social and 
environmental policies, but diversity in 
culture 
Strong government regulation supported 
by high environmental consciousness 
Decentralized and decarbonized world 
Population Low growth, with its peak at 9 billion 
around 2050, and 7 billion in 2100 [*1] 
Population over age 60: 40% in 2100 
[*2] 
Low growth, with its peak at 9 billion 
around 2050, and 7 billion in 2100 [*1] 
Population over age 60: 40% in 2100 [*2]
Demographics Household size shrink very much, from 
4.2 in 1990 to 2.3 in 2100 [*2] 
High growth of households, from 1.3 
billion in 1990 to 2.7 billion in 2100 
[*2] 
Household size shrink not so much, from 
4.2 in 1990 to around 3 in 2100 [*3] 
Smaller growth of households, from 1.3 
billion in 1990 to 2.0 billion in 2100 [*3] 
Economy Very high economic growth, around 3% 
per annum [*1] 
Quantity above sustainability but with 
high efficiency and low emissions 
High economic growth, around 2.5% per 
annum [*1] 
Durable goods and quality are valued 
Dematerialization and virtual consumption
Urbanization 
and housing 
Highly urbanized, high-density 
megacities with mass transit, low-
density, automobile-dominant cities 
Housing size large with high per capita 
floor area 
Growing number of families are single 
person households 
Insulation, seasonal storage 
Compact cities and suburban sprawl with 
highly-developed public transportation 
systems 
Housing size smaller, more compact 
People tend to live multiperson 
households 
Excellent insulation, seasonal storage, 
compactly build houses, cars part of house 
energy system  
Transport Very high demand for passenger 
mobility and freight transport 
Around 4 billion vehicles [*4] 
Private transportation dominates in rural 
areas, mass transit in megacites. High 
demand for long-distance and inter-
continental travel: maglevs + 
hypersonic. 
High demand for passenger mobility and 
freight transport 
Around 3 billion vehicles [*4] 
Public transportation popular and private 
is also coordinated publicly (like taxis) 
Cities are connected with rapid train 
systems and efficient aircarft 
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Table 4.1. Continued 
Energy supply Large-scale renewables including off-
shore farms, nuclear including HTR, 
carbon capture and storage 
Distributed renewable systems with on-site 
generation, decentralized systems with grid 
connection but without large-scale transport 
Energy 
transmission 
Integrated infrastructures including the 
supergrid for hydricity transport 
Local and regional grids for electricity, 
liquids and gases 
Residential 
end-use 
Nanomachines and robots 
Convergence of information, cognitive and 
communication technologies 
Energy cascades and cogeneration 
Local generation with emphasis on low-
energy intensity lifestyles 
Integrated cogeneration and transport 
through fuel-cell vehicles connected to 
buildings 
Industrial end-
use 
Efficiency improvement rate very high 
Industrial ecology closes the materials 
flows. 
 
Efficiency improvement rate high and 
change toward eco-production 
Dematerialization and production with zero 
waste 
Carbon 
sequestration 
Large scale sequestration, more than 250 
GtC from 2000 to 2100 [*5] 
Sequestration into depleted fields, aquifers
and deep ocean 
Well-developed infrastructure for carbon 
transportation on continental scales 
Moderate scale sequestration, 50 to 100 GtC 
from 2000 to 2100 [*5] 
Local storage in depleted fields. 
Infrastructure for carbon transportation not 
developed. Carbon is transported only to
depleted gas and oil fields. 
Agriculture and 
biomass 
Rapid growth of agricultural productivity 
Landless agriculture (industrial production 
in closed “greenhouses”) 
Virtual independence from natural 
ecosystems for food services 
Increasingly meat diet 
Sustainable agriculture with low intensity of 
energy and fertilizers, ecologically sound 
Inefficient animal production on land 
decreasing 
Aqua-cultivation 
Increasingly vegetarian diet 
Technology Convergence of emerging technologies 
into a new techno-economic paradigm: 
Nanotechnology, biogenetic technology, 
information, cognitive and information 
technologies. 
Large-scale systems and integrated 
infrastructures 
High-levels of R&D and initial technology 
support. 
Smaller-scale, local systems. High emphasis 
on dematerialization, efficiency and low 
waste 
On site systems with virtual integration 
(rather than physical). 
High-levels of R&D for eco-sustainability 
and low emissions.  
Emphasis on local solutions. 
 
[*1] Nakicenovic et al., 2000, SRES 
[*2] O’Neill et al. 2001. Population and Climate Change. 
[*3] based on an assumption that education and policies encourage larger households. 
[*4] Schafer and Victor (1999) estimate that absolute levels of mobility in 2050 around 100 trillion 
passenger-km, and its 40% from car travel. Based on Schafer and Victor (1999), Turton and Barreto 
(2004) estimate about 37 trillion km car travel in 2100. Assuming the 1 hour/day travel-time budget and 
average speed at 50km/hour, these figures mean that the number of future vehicles would be around 2 
billion, either in 2050 or in 2100. 
[*5] TAR: 250 Gt-C for A1T-450, 200Gt-C for B1-450, and 50 Gt-C for B1-550. 
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5. A1H&E Storyline 
 
The A1H&E storyline describes a world that is characterized by rapid demographic 
transition (declining mortality and fertility rates) and hence low population levels, very 
high productivity and economic growth in all regions, and comparatively high energy 
and material demands.4 The rapid and successful economic development worldwide is 
driven by high human capital (education), innovation, technology diffusion, and free 
trade. These are the main sources of productivity growth and modernization of social 
and economic structures, largely following the “Western” (e.g., OECD) model. 
 
These developments in the A1 scenario family and the underlying storyline are rooted in 
the successful globalization in the world that results in very high productivity rates 
while preserving local identity and diversity. In this storyline, institutions are effective, 
markets are functioning well, property rights are universally respected and poverty 
basically eradicated, as we know it today. The main motor of this unprecedented 
affluence in the world is development in all of its facets. Many of the now poor regions 
and social strata in the world achieve a conditional (and relative) catch-up. They 
leapfrog some of the development stages even though they do not generally manage to 
close the income or consumption gap in absolute terms. This means that all parts of the 
world would achieve high levels of affluence by the end of the 21st century, even if 
disparities will not have disappeared entirely. In any cases, the current distinction 
between “developed” and “developing” countries in any case will no longer be 
appropriate in this scenario. At the same time, now affluent regions of the world 
generally become even more affluent. Markets rule. Geopolitically, this world could be 
described as “Pax-Americana”, a world of hegemony associated with one single world 
power, but a world where this stable political, economic and social order furthers 
growth and development to benefit of many. 
 
There are many possible symbolic “images” of this storyline that can be captured by 
catch-phrases like: “Fly High”, “Technopolis”, “Rich & Clean” or “Bussines Class” 
world. An earlier catch phrase for this storyline was the “Tiger World” to denote rapid 
technological, institutional and economic catch-up of the so-called four Tigers in Asia 
during the 1990s. They portrayed the successful development paradigm associated with 
the A1H&E storyline. The color image of this storyline might be silver, chrome or 
titanium. 
 
5.1. A1H&E Characteristics 
 
The principal scenario drivers are prosperity and affluence. All major scenario-driving 
forces are closely linked to prosperity levels, with actual causality links going both 
ways. For instance, demographic variables co-evolve with prosperity: mortality declines 
(life expectancy increases) as a function of higher incomes enabling better diets and 
affordable medical treatment.  In turn, changes in social values and relations underlying 
the fertility transition along the historical European and Asian experience pave the way 
                                                 
4 The A1H&E storyline is rooted in the SRES A1 scenario storyline (Nakicenovic et al., 2000). The 
emphasis on hydrogen and electricity and the broader narratives presented in this section (5.) are based on 
an earlier draft of the A1 storyline and quantification by Arnulf Grübler that dates back to 1998. It has 
been updated in the meantime to reflect some of the recent developments and scenario literature. We 
reproduce parts of this storyline here verbatim and use it extensively to develop the hydricity story. We 
are grateful for the explicit permission of the author to use this material in this report (Grübler, 2005a). 
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also for wider access to education, modernization of economic structures, market 
orientation, etc. that are a key for innovation and diffusion of best practice technologies 
underlying the high productivity, and hence economic growth of the scenario. To 
summarize: High prosperity levels allow significant increases in investments into 
education, R&D, and the experimentation with new product and process innovations 
that in turn nurture high demand and productivity growth and hence, exert a powerful 
positive feedback mechanism on economic growth. 
 
A corollary of the high economic growth via innovation and free trade logic of the 
scenario is that the mobility of people, ideas, and technologies co-evolves closely with 
the high economic growth rates of the scenario. Traditional, as well as novel 
(supersonic, maglev’s) transportation modes co-evolve with radical changes in ICT 
(virtual Internet, robotics and nanotechnologies). Transport and communication are not 
only complementary in this scenario but enhance each other synergistically. Energy 
technologies embrace a wide portfolio of hydricity systems (supergrid, CO2-turbines 
and other zero-emissions power plants, high-temperature reactors, large-scale 
photovoltaics systems, off-shore and other remote wind farms as well as pervasive use 
of fuel cells). There is a strong “convergence” across all of these technologies to 
produce a new techno-economic paradigm, growth and the resulting affluence and 
prosperity in the world.  
 
Limiting Factors and Diseconomies 
 
The core bifurcation of the scenario with respect to hydricity technologies unfolds 
around alternative paths of addressing externalities of massive growth in energy 
services required to sustain mobility, communication and information flows worldwide 
and in general high levels of material and “dematerialized” consumption patterns. These 
externalities include in particular congestion and local and regional environmental 
protection in case of transport, issues of privacy and informational security in case of 
communication, and issues of waste management and ecosystem protection in case of 
material consumption.  
 
One aspect of this storyline, let us call it the “Unlimited Consumption” (or “Growth to 
Limits”), necessitates to mitigation of numerous negative externalities through market 
forces that promote vigorous technological innovation efforts, reviving the high 
experimentation rates and short innovation product life cycles, characteristic of the early 
pioneering days of air transportation and mobile telephones. Vigorous innovation is 
therefore the industry response for overcoming potential barriers arising from the 
formidably high growth of energy services in this storyline. Safety, privacy, congestion, 
and local and regional environmental impacts (noise, emissions) are addressed 
successfully by introduction of advanced technology concepts. The motivation for these 
innovations are less environmental, but simply an economic innovation response to 
overcome bottlenecks, to avoid stringent regulation by the public sector, and to allow 
for sustained growth. In this scenario, anthropogenic interference with Earth systems 
such as the adverse impacts on biosphere and ecosphere turn out to much lower than 
previously anticipated and the high income societies of the future can easily adapt to it 
(either through substitution of ecosystems services through technology such as 
bioengineering or through management of threatened ecosystems). In any case, global 
environmental issues are relatively high on the priority list in this storyline. However, 
they do not result in massive behavioral change. Instead, the measures to counter the 
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adverse environmental impacts are primarily directed at closing the “production and 
consumption cycles” such as the decarbonization of energy carriers (thus hydricity 
technologies) and central conversion facilities. One could say that the natural ecology is 
replaced by industrial ecology in this storyline there where people live in high densities. 
Elsewhere, land is “returned” to nature. This is consistent with recent developments in 
Europe and North America where human land-use has declined in favor of (mostly 
managed) nature. 
 
Regulatory Frameworks and Globalization 
 
Many of these tendencies in the storyline lead to strong regulatory frameworks. Strict 
governmental regulations (including the global level) provide for a regulatory “push and 
pull” on technology: “Pulling-in” desirable technologies and characteristics via 
regulation and incentives; “Pushing-out” undesirable ones. Initially, regulatory push and 
pull factors focus on rapid, incremental improvements of existing technologies (e.g. 
fuel-efficient prime movers such as aircraft engines), but over the longer-term 
increasingly the focus shifts to radical technological solutions, e.g. banning 
progressively the use of kerosene in air transport in order to stimulate the market 
adoption of cryogenic hydrogen aircraft. Overall, this does tend to result in less 
“diverse” technological change and experimentation in this storyline compared to a 
hypothetical scenario variant with less regulatory interference. The advantage is that the 
direction of technological change is to rapidly respond to evolving environmental 
concerns, especially climate change, whose impacts turn out to be much larger than 
previously anticipated, unfolding rapidly already in the first decades of the 21st century. 
This leads to a frenzy regulatory effort of emission reduction and impact mitigation, 
while still maintaining the high economic growth priorities characteristic of this 
scenario family. 
 
As a consequence of these general tendencies, A1H&E storyline specifies more 
emphasis on the centralized energy conversion, distribution and end-use patterns. It is 
an urbanized world but as mentioned with much of the land “given back” to the nature. 
Humanity is concentrated predominantly in large urban corridors and mega-settlement 
patterns. Current examples would be the Tokyo-Osaka corridor, the Ruhr cluster in 
Europe, the eastern seaboard in the US and many of the main mega-cities in the 
developing parts of the world ranging from Delhi, Beijing and Mexico City to Sao 
Paolo. Such settlement patterns could emerge in the future across the Trans-Siberian 
Corridor and elsewhere in Asia, Africa and Latin America. They may become more 
focused in the “North” today but are not all that likely to expand massively due to the 
aging and declining population trends. A1H&E storyline implies massive infrastructural 
developments in particular in the now developing parts of the world. In the energy area 
this implies development of large sources of primary energy, integrated (super)grids 
from electricity and pipelines to cryogenic networks for energy gases. Most of the 
conversion and transformation would be central providing very flexible and 
environmentally benign structures of energy end use. Lifestyles are likely to change 
fundamentally in this future world as time progresses, especially toward the end of the 
century, but this version of the hydricity age story is in principle consistent with current 
lifestyles and settlement patterns of the most affluent parts of the world. 
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5.2. A1H&E: Key Drivers 
 
Population, economic development, and regional disparities 
 
The linkage between demographic and economic variables in A1H&E storyline is based 
on present empirical observations: The affluent live long, they have few children and 
live in small (often single-person) households. High per capita incomes are thus 
associated today with both low mortality and low fertility rates. Advanced and 
widespread medical technologies avert emergence of pandemics and other “premature” 
causes of death. 
 
Causality links are bi-directional. For instance, increasing economic affluence and 
higher workforce participation of women may lower fertility rates.  Alternatively, high 
education and resulting female empowerment result in modernization of traditional 
social structures, lowering fertility rates, and subsequently provide the social conditions 
for a "take-off" in accelerated economic development. 
 
Combining low fertility and low mortality results in a rather low population projection, 
characterized in addition by an considerably "graying" of the population age structure. 
The SRES A1T scenario suggests a quantification in which fertility rates could range 
between 1.3 to 1.7 children per women, replicating current sub-replacement fertility 
patterns of the affluent globally. Mortality rates would also be very low, with life 
expectancy approaching 100 years on average. In this scenario global population would 
peak below 9 billion by ca. 2050, in order to decline thereafter to some 7 billion by the 
end of the 21st century. 
 
The economic growth scenario takes analogy to historical examples of most successful 
economic catch up, such as Scandinavia and Japan after WW II, to describe possible 
future development patterns of current low-income countries. The scenario is one of 
conditional convergence in which “the poor get richer, and the rich slow down”. 
 
The global economy in the A1H&E storyline expands at an average annual rate of three 
percent per year to 2100, i.e. at the same rate as the average of the successful OECD 
countries since mid-19th century.  Non-Annex-I5 economies expand with an average 
annual growth rate of four percent per year twice as fast as Annex-I economies. Over 
time, growth rates decline as per capita incomes increasingly approach current OECD 
levels.  Based on the quantification of the SRES A1T scenario the global economy 
could roughly triple each by 2020, 2050, and 2100; approaching 50, 150, and 500 
trillion $ over these three time periods. 
 
Equity is not a major concern in the scenario, but rather a “byproduct” of the high rates 
of economic development.  Existing per capita income gaps between regions close up in 
relative terms from a factor of 16 (6 in purchasing power parity terms) between Annex I 
and Non-Annex I countries in 1990 down to a factor of about two in 2100 (in a similar 
way as income gap “closed” of Western Europe and Japan to the US in the 20th 
century). Approximately by 2030 Non-Annex-I GDP would surpass that of Annex-I 
economies. Per capita income level disparities are also reduced, but differences between 
regions are not entirely eliminated. Non-Annex-I per capita income could reach the 
                                                 
5 As defined in the UNFCCC (1992). Annex-I countries correspond to the industrialized countries, subject 
to the provisions of the UN FCCC. Non-Annex-I countries correspond to the developing countries. 
  29
1990 Annex-I level (of some $14,000 per capita) by ca. 2040/2050. By 2100 per capita 
incomes would approach $100,000 per capita in Annex-I countries, and could reach up 
to $70,000 per capita in Non-Annex-I countries, making current distinctions between 
“poor” and “rich” obsolete. 
 
Box: Demographic and Economic Development in ASIA Region 
 
The global demographic and economic tendencies in the A1H&E storyline are 
reflected n the regional development patterns. For example, population growth in 
ASIA would stabilize at a level of about 4.2 billion by 2050 in order to decline 
thereafter under the high-income, below-replacement fertility assumptions 
characteristic for this scenario storyline. By 2100, ASIA’s population would decline 
to a level of close to 3 billion inhabitants, characterized by high income and resource 
consumption levels. Per capita income levels could reach $75,000 by 2100 in this 
(extreme) high growth storyline and primary energy use in ASIA could reach some 
860 EJ by 2100, i.e. twice the level of current global energy use. Clearly, the 
infrastructural and technological implications of such development are unprecedented 
at this scale. This is one of the reasons why large-scale and integrated energy 
infrastructures are an important feature of the storyline. 
 
Social Trends and Governance 
 
The economic growth and conditional convergence focus of the “High Growth” 
scenario go hand in hand with an increasing convergence of social values and lifestyles 
along the “Western” hedonistic model, furthering emphasis on small family size, 
material well-being, and leisure. Increasing consumerism of the developing world is 
thus a central feature of this kind of scenario. Ceteris paribus, material demands would 
be similar to those of the affluent OECD countries at similar levels of per capita income, 
even if regional and cultural differences will not entirely disappear. Asians, for instance 
would continue “to eat rice” and still appreciate more collective leisure experiences in 
traveling together in groups and for shorter time periods, whereas Americans would 
ultimately adopt healthy Mediterranean diets and Western European recreational travel 
models of long summer vacations to coastal areas combined with more individualistic 
extensive “adventure” travel to far away destinations (even if those no longer would be 
“exotic” in the traditional, 20th century sense). Nonetheless, traditional consumerism 
might not grow linearly with affluence indefinitely. As evidenced in food habits and 
expenditures, saturation phenomena might set in, furthering rather qualitative than 
quantitative growth, e.g. in high quality services, arts, and special, high value leisure 
activities. Thus, affluent consumers, instead of taking more single long-distance, low-
budget trips would increasingly opt for fewer, but extreme high luxury “cruises” in 
which trips per se are more important than the destinations visited, combining 
sequences of “world around” interesting destinations much along the lines of current 
luxury ocean cruises. Thus, even with fewer trips, travel distances (and thus air travel 
demand, expressed in passenger-km) might continue to grow. With rising incomes, 
travel budgets would rise accordingly, approaching globally some 15 percent of 
available income, as is the case today in the most affluent societies, split however over a 
variety of different transport modes, with local and regional transport continuing to take 
the lion’s share. However, ultimately travel time budget constraints (on average one 
hour per day spent traveling) might become dominant even in air transportation 
resulting in a revival of super- and hypersonic aircraft designs, including orbital flights. 
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Such developments would unfold first for the most affluent and powerful, e.g. in form 
of super-sonic executive jets, but would gradually become widely available also for the 
“everyday” consumer (e.g. post 2050) in form of family jets or scaled-up, spacious 
super- and hypersonic aircraft designs for hundreds of passengers. Consumers in such a 
scenario would therefore vigorously refuse current aircraft designs, combining slow 
subsonic speed with dense passenger “packing”. Beyond 2070, even space travel might 
emerge as a small, extremely high value market niche. Both supersonic and hypersonic 
flight as well as space travel would be based on hydrogen propulsion. Thus, hydrogen 
would appear to be a necessary technology in the A1H&E storyline. 
 
Overall, the economic focus of the scenario presumes both “laissez-faire” as well as 
effective governance at the regional and international level. (The traditional small nation 
state would largely be gone, replaced instead by regional economic associations and 
trans-national companies.)  Non-interventionist governance is the key concept for not 
intervening with the functioning of free markets, innovation experimentation, and 
economic growth. Governance would instead focus on a few key areas of public goods 
and externalities, such as knowledge (education and R&D), market failures 
(technological standards in order to reduce high costs of parallel standards and assuring 
market transparency), as well as environmental externalities. 
 
Varying degrees of government intervention (regulation) provides for the core 
bifurcation into two sub-scenarios. 
 
One subgroup might be related more to the original A1T story that is not limited by 
climate considerations. There, hydricity emerges because of convenience and other 
driving forcers rather than the climate protection per se. In ”Unlimited Skies” versions 
of the A1H&E storylines, governments serve primarily as “moderators” to raise 
awareness to industry and act as facilitators in R&D and technology development 
consortia. The traditional regulatory paradigm is replaced by “soft” (talk to) policy 
concepts, providing for few stringent regulatory constraints. 
 
Conversely, in “Regulatory Push&Pull“ or “Stabilization at 450ppm“ versions, industry 
recognizes the advantages of predictable regulatory environments and relies on regional 
and international institutions to provide equal level playing fields and common 
environmental standards for all market participants.  Increasing attention for instance is 
devoted to preserve local air and water quality, that trigger both conservation 
innovations as well as novel, zero-emission technologies, particularly in the transport 
sector. A new hydrogen infrastructure develops first incrementally along with natural 
gas pipeline systems to provide energy for fuel cell vehicles in megacities. First 
dedicated pipelines emerge by 2040, by which time also some aircraft and automobiles 
start use hydrogen fuel. Effective governance is especially called for in addressing 
climate change, especially after its effects assume dramatic proportions in the near-
collapse of the North Atlantic thermohaline circulation and the Asian Monsoon between 
2052-2058. An ambitious target of a zero-carbon global economy by 2100 is agreed by 
2060, and great structural shifts begin to take place after 2075 and yield substantial 
emission reductions by 2100, even if it takes yet another 40 years to fully phase out 
carbon emissions. In such a scenario zero-carbon energy sources could account for up to 
85 percent of global energy supply by 2100. 
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Environment and Ecology 
 
By assumption (and cultural Western development model bias) the ecological resilience 
in the scenario is assumed to be high.  Ecological concerns are also low in their own 
right.  Instead the valuation of environmental amenities is strictly valued in monetary 
terms, with the valuation closely linked to rising income levels. Non-congestion, clean 
water and air, avoidance of nuisance by traffic noise, recreational possibilities in nature, 
etc. all assume increasing importance with rising affluence, albeit preferences for 
environmental amenities may remain different across regions and income levels.  For 
instance urban air quality and human health would be valued highly even at income 
levels lower than those prevailing in England where stringent air quality measures were 
introduced after the “killer smog” of 1952. Reduced particulate and sulfur air pollution 
are assumed to become a matter of major consumer preference at levels of $2,000 to 
3,000  per capita income in Asia. Altogether, the concept of environmental quality 
might change in this scenario from “conservation” of nature to active “management” 
(and marketing) of natural and environmental amenities and services. Because 
environmental quality can be marketed for products and services, there is little need for 
government regulation per se, as polluting producers and products are essentially driven 
out of the market. “Life cycle semiconductors” are attached to any product/service sold 
recording and communicating all externalities associated and providing complete 
market transparence. Product responsibility is also valued high, litigation and 
compensation for externalities imposed are the norm in this affluent world. For instance, 
already by 2020, compensation schemes ($1000 per capita for each exposure to above 
75 dB) are established by court ruling in the US to compensate for aircraft noise, a trend 
that spreads also to Europe and Asia, especially in high density urban corridors by 2050. 
Similar market-oriented regulatory frameworks can be imagined for other spheres of 
human activities in this storyline 
 
In a sub-scenario variant, above “free market” philosophy for the environment is 
contrasted by a strict regulatory approach. Instead allowing for market compensation of 
environmental damages, environmental externalities are aimed to be “regulated away” 
altogether, especially after it became apparent that the scale of climate change damages 
would exceed any reasonable financial compensation even in a $150 Trillion GDP 
world economy of 2050. This “Regulatory Push&Pull” scenario would gradually branch 
out from the “High Growth” world after 2020, including first local and regional 
environmental issues, and after 2060 also a strict global climate change regulatory 
regime. 
 
Resources and Technology 
 
Resource availability and technology are tightly interrelated in this High Growth, “high 
tech” storyline.  High productivity growth results from substantial technological 
innovation and both contribute to economic growth, expansion of accessible resources, 
and improved efficiency in resource use.  Resource availability is largely technology 
driven, rather than the other way around. For instance, new non-fossil technologies like 
hydrogen emerge out from supply push factors related to technological innovations in 
fuel cell vehicles rather than being “forced” by increasing resource scarcity. As a result 
the call on fossil resources, which is comparatively high in this High Growth world, is 
mitigated by continuous innovation and structural change. For instance, by 2020 zero-
carbon energy sources could contribute some 15 percent of global energy, a share that 
  32
would expand to roughly one third by 2050, perhaps approaching two thirds by 2100 (as 
illustrated in the comparable IPCC-SRES-A1T scenario).  
 
In domains of significance for environmental regulation in the “Regulatory Push&Pull” 
sub-story, this progress would even be faster: reaching some 20 percent global market 
share by 2020, 40 forty  by 2050, even 85 percent by 2100 (as illustrated in the A1T 
scenario). 
 
Box: Nanotechnology 
 
Nanotechnology in conjunction with advanced information, communication and 
energy systems holds the promise of improving performance and reducing materials 
and energy requirements. The basic idea already possible in the laboratory is to 
make machines such as motors, robot arms or computers much smaller than a living 
cell on the scale of a nanometer, thus the name nanotechnology. Possible 
applications are widespread, from communications, medicine, transportation to 
agriculture and for industry in general. 
 
Nanomachines would lead to unprecedented dematerialization along with much 
lower environmental impacts on all scales including much lower demand for 
energy. There are however also many inherent dangers. Nanomachines like bacteria 
are tiny. Somehow, they would need to self-replicate and self-repair themselves. 
There is also an inherent implication of self-organization. Today, experimental 
nanomachines are powered by radiant energy (eg. microwave) or batteries but if 
they ever become truly autonomous they would need to store energy in between 
“charge” times. Hydrogen and electricity offer in combination with each other two 
ideal, non-polluting energy carriers for the nano-world. 
 
Nanotechnologies could become an essential component of the new techno-
economic paradigm through convergence of many technologies into fundamentally 
new systems or they may remain to be very specialized diffusion only in some 
narrow niches. Consider a hypothetical case of bacteria-scale robots that could be 
administered for both diagnostic and repair duties in human bodies but also in many 
other devices and living beings. This would require billions if not trillions of such 
nano-robotic devices. The diffusion would indeed be very pervasive. The other 
possibility is that such machines are used only for medical purposes under very 
controlled conditions (say only in hospitals). In that case, the diffusion would be 
rather limited and not all that different from the scale of MRI machines used today 
for medical purposes. 
 
Overall, the dynamism of technological innovation is broad-based, including many 
radical solutions, from “engineered” human health, landless farming, bio-engineered 
renewable feedstock and structural materials. High rates of experimentation and a free 
market orientation provide evidently for numerous negative surprises, which are 
however addressed by compensatory and adaptive mechanisms rather than by traditional 
regulatory banning regimes. The latter option would however be considered for key 
strategic areas such as climate change, assumed to be significant in the “Regulatory 
Push&Pull” sub-scenario. 
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Communication and Transport 
 
Communication and transportation technologies and styles are highly homogeneous and 
extremely developed in this “High Growth” world, extending current virtual and 
physical communication patterns of urban elites to a global phenomenon, driven by the 
twin driving forces of income growth, and continuous cost reductions, particularly in 
communication technology. Information and data transmissions finally really become 
“too cheap to meter” and as of 2020 communication costs for all modes drop to zero 
globally. One hand side this new economic balance shifts emphasis from physical, 
“batch” travel to instantaneous mobility, especially after virtual realty avatars and 
sensuality robots available for transmitting a wide range of sensual experiences (vision, 
sound, smell, texture) become widely available after 2040. On the other hand, vastly 
increased communication flows also induce additional travel. The end result might 
simply be “dynamics as usual” from a long-run historical perspective, where 
communication and transport flows have roughly grown at two percentage points faster 
than GDP (translating to a 5 percent annual growth rate globally for the average three 
percent per year GDP assumed for the “High Growth” story). 
 
Box: Decarbonization in the Hydricity Age without “Tears” 
 
Natural gas is likely to be a bridge toward a hydrogen future. Even though methane 
has roughly half the carbon emissions compared to coal, large-scale use of natural 
gas by future societies, in conjunction with climate protection, may require 
widespread decarbonization. This is for example necessary in Post-SRES A1T-550 
stabilization scenario. Marchetti (1985) has proposed an effective way of achieving 
this goal. Essentially, natural gas would be steam-reformed into hydrogen and 
carbon dioxide close to the wells. Carbon would be reinjected in the reservoirs to 
achieve enhanced recovery or into the aquifers in the vicinity of the facilities. This 
is similar to the Sleipner Project in the North Sea where carbon dioxide is separated 
from methane and reinjected into an aquifer below the sea and below the reservoir. 
 
Separated hydrogen would either be transported by its own infrastructures in 
pipelines or as a super-cooled liquid or it could be blended to the methane and 
separated again through membranes for use in smaller-scale facilities. The larger 
ones could use the mixture of methane and hydrogen in conjunction with carbon 
capture. A possible technology could be zero-emissions power plants that utilize 
carbon dioxide as a working fluid in the (high-pressure) gas turbines. These could 
use an oxifuel mixture of methane and hydrogen that would result in water vapor 
and additional carbon dioxide after combustion. Water vapor could be separated, 
additional carbon dioxide stored and the rest recycled back into the turbine. 
 
Steam reforming of methane requires energy because it is an endothermic process. 
About half of the energy is stored in the form of hydrogen and about half is required 
for the reaction. This can be provided by a zero-carbon source such as high-
temperature solar or nuclear power (HTR). The decided advantage of this scheme is 
that methane essentially becomes the feedstock for production of hydrogen 
substantially reducing the carbon dioxide storage requirements and natural gas use.  
 
Rather than a “global village” future this is however rather one of “global cities” 
because existing trends towards even higher urbanization continue in this scenario as 
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cities provide the highest “network externalities” for the educational and R&D intensive 
economic development pattern underlying the scenario.  Regional differences in 
settlement patterns however persist ranging from fragmented “compact” (but large, i.e. 
20+ million inhabitants) cities that draw on (and depopulate) their respective rural 
hinterlands in Latin America (e.g. Sao Paulo) to urban “corridors” connected by high 
capacity communication and transport networks in Asia, Europe and in the coastal areas 
of North Africa and North America.  Regional transport networks include high speed 
trains, maglev's, ultimately fusing short- and long-distance transport technologies 
(metro's) into single interconnected infrastructures making current distinctions between 
short- and long-distance travel increasingly blurred.  Air transportation would focus on 
intercontinental travel and some feeder functions to smaller urban areas, but is unlikely 
to provide for the vast amounts of passenger flows traveling within the regional urban 
clusters as daily commuters. Ultimately, ballistic intercontinental travel might become a 
reality in this storyline. 
 
Box: Energy SuperGrid for the Hydricity Age 
 
The Energy SuperGrid proposal calls for supplementing the existing high voltage 
electric grid using superconducting dc cables for power transmission with liquid 
hydrogen used as the core coolant. The electric power and hydrogen would be 
supplied from nuclear and other source power plants spaced along the grid. Electricity 
would exit the system at various taps, connecting into the existing ac power grid 
directly in the urban load centers. The hydrogen would also exit the grid, providing a 
readily available, alternative fuel, for perhaps fuel-cell based automobiles. Hydrogen 
could also be generated locally by electrolysis using the electricity supplied by the 
superconducting cables.  
The need for the superconducting cables arises because of the current stress on the 
existing ac transmission grid. In most urban areas there is little spare transmission 
capacity and few available right-of-ways for the construction of new lines. Replacing 
the petroleum-based transportation energy worldwide, an amount equal to about a 
third of all final energy, with hydrogen will require either new hydrogen pipelines or 
large amounts of electric energy to generate the hydrogen locally. The SuperGrid 
proposal addresses both issues through its subterranean electric/hydrogen “energy 
pipeline.” 
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In short the Energy SuperGrid is a proposal for an enhanced infrastructure to meet the 
energy needs of large urban areas of future megacities if one assumes a drastic 
reduction in fossil fuel consumption, particularly petroleum and perhaps natural gas.  
 
The Energy SuperGrid concept goes beyond the vision of a future hydrogen 
economy, or the simple extrapolation of electrification, to a duality of a hydrogen – 
electricity future, hydricity. In this vision electricity and hydrogen become synergistic 
elements in the future energy infrastructure. This energy delivery grid interconnects 
remote sources with load centers, links regional ac interconnections and connects 
concentrated population centers with remote nuclear and modern renewable resources 
and integrates hydrogen utilization in combined heat and power facilities and 
hydrogen storage for mobility or transportation usage. 
 
Separable from the Energy SuperGrid, but a possible valuable dual use, would be the 
eventual common use of the energy pipeline tunnels with underground high-speed 
transportation system using maglev propulsion. A common tunnel for energy and 
transportation is a speculative concept if a combustible fuel is transported in the 
common tunnel (see the illustration above). For electricity and transportation systems 
it is technically feasible and well founded today. 
 
The overall Energy SuperGrid R&D program needs to pursue several technological 
platforms in parallel along with a systems engineering-economics effort that 
integrates and cuts across the technology platforms. Following the practical 
demonstration of engineering feasibility, at what for this concept might be considered 
a pilot scale, a series of real world, field experiments should be pursued with physical 
distances of first kilometers and then tens of kilometers. 
 
The large urban agglomerates and the high transport demands of a high material growth 
economy generate potentially vast congestion constraints, solved by applying either 
market based instruments (prices) as in “Unlimited Skies” or by governmental 
regulation as in “Regulatory Push&Pull”. Market based instruments would include for 
instance systematic “just-in-time” access and parking fees, auctioning of (the limited 
number) of new car and truck registrations in megacities, etc. much along the (stringent) 
Singapore model. Therefore even at very high income levels, car ownership rates could 
be comparatively low, and in extremely densely populated areas rather a luxury than a 
means of mass-transport (cf. Hong Kong).  In lower density areas car densities are high 
(more than one car per inhabitant); their fuel systems oil versus electricity or hydrogen 
being varied regionally. Furthermore, intercontinental transport could well be provided 
by (energy and GHG intensive) hypersonic aircraft fueled by methane or hydrogen. 
Hypersonic transport would be the physical transport equivalent of the high capacity 
virtual communication “backbones” of a truly global economy, paving the way for 
space travel that could emerge towards the end of the 21st century (post 2070). 
 
Development and integration of global grids and networks is an important paradigm of 
the A1H&T storyline. This is best illustrated by the vision of a continental supergrid 
that delivers electricity and hydrogen in an integrated energy pipeline (see the box 
above). The notion of a global SuperGrid was pioneered by Chauncey Starr (Overbye et 
al., 2002) of the Electric Power Institute (EPRI). The supergrid would use a high-
capacity, super-conducting power-transmission cable cooled with liquid hydrogen 
produced by advanced nuclear plants, with some hydrogen ultimately used in fuel cell 
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vehicles and generators. A most radical version of this global infrastructure would 
include maglev’s and high-capacity communication and information networks within 
the same infrastructures. This way energy, mobility and information would connect and 
integrate the globe into one anthropogenic system.  
 
 
6. B1H&E Storyline 
 
Like A1H&E, the B1H&E storyline also describes a world that is characterized by rapid 
demographic transition (declining mortality and fertility rates) and hence low population 
levels, productivity increases directed at environmental sustainability in all regions, 
combined with very high energy efficiencies, low materials demands and fundamental 
lifestyle changes. 6  The transition toward the sustainable development worldwide is 
driven by high and universal environmental awareness. This is reflected in high human 
capital (education), innovation, technology diffusion, and international frameworks for 
environmental and ecosystems protection. These are the main sources of change in 
social and economic structures toward sustainability on all scales from local to global, 
largely following the “green” ideals and “dematerialized” lifestyles. 
 
These developments in the B1H&E storyline are rooted in the successful globalization 
in the world toward environmental protection and sustainability. This transition is 
directed at preserving local identity and diversity but within the context of harmony 
with nature. Ecosystems services are an essential and ever more important aspect of 
human well being, but are not consumed at the expense of natural environment and 
future generations. In this storyline, institutions are effective, markets are universally 
regulated to internalize adverse environmental impacts, property rights are universally 
respected and poverty basically eradicated, as we know it today. The main motor of this 
high degree of equity and equality that preserves diversity in the world is the drive 
toward sustainable development and lifestyles.  
 
Many of the now poor regions and social strata in the world achieve a conditional (and 
relative) catch-up partially through endogenous sources of development and partially 
through effective ODA and transfer of know how and know why through capacity 
building and learning. They leapfrog many of the development stages without ever even 
approaching the high consumption and emissions patterns of now developed parts of the 
world. This means that all parts of the world would achieve many goals of sustainable 
development by the end of the 21st century, leading to almost universal disappearance 
of poverty in the world. Like in the A1H&E storyline, the current distinction between 
“developed” and “developing” countries will no longer be appropriate in this scenario. 
In this storyline, now affluent regions of the world generally do not become much more 
affluent in terms of “physical” consumption, but indeed in terms of “virtual” and 
“dematerialized” consumption. Environmental and ecosystem protection rules. 
Geopolitically, this world could be described as “Pluralistic” and multipolar world of 
                                                 
6 The B1H&E storyline is rooted in the SRES B1 scenario storyline (Nakicenovic et al., 2000). The 
emphasis on hydrogen and electricity and the broader narratives presented in this section (6.) are based on 
an earlier draft of the B1 storyline and quantification by Arnulf Grübler that dates back to 1998. It has 
been updated in the meantime to reflect some of the recent developments and scenario literature. We 
reproduce parts of this storyline here verbatim and use it extensively to develop the hydricity story. We 
are grateful for the explicit permission of the author  to use this material in this report (Grübler, 2005b). 
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diversity of cultures and lifestyles with predominant global harmonization of 
environmental protection. It is a world where this stable political, economic and social 
order furthers sustainable development and equity to benefit of many. 
The central elements of this storyline are high levels of environmental and social 
consciousness combined with globally coherent approach to sustainability based on a 
combination of lifestyle changes favoring quality over quantity and the development of 
“appropriate” and environmentally friendly technologies and settlement patterns. 
Heightened environmental consciousness might be brought about by clear evidence that 
impacts of natural resource use, such as deforestation, soil depletion, over-fishing, 
acidification, and climate change pose a serious threat to the continuation of human life 
on Earth. Likewise, continued economic disparities across and within regions are 
increasingly recognized as a threat to the sustainability of political and social structures 
as contributing to terrorism, conflicts, unrest, and vulnerability of societies and 
economies. Governments, businesses, the media, and the public pay increased attention 
to the environmental and social aspects of development. These changes in the ideation 
of the dominant development paradigm of the 20th century translate into changing 
perceptions, values, and preferences of private citizens and the public sector alike. The 
“slow food” movement, emerging at the end of the 20th century, serves as a guide for 
the global diffusion of “slow” lifestyles, in terms of diets, consumption and transport 
patterns, as well as attitudes towards the acceptability of new technologies. 
 
There are many possible symbolic “images” of this storyline that can be captured by 
catch-phrases like: “Down to Earth”, “Ecogarden”, “Green & Clean”, “Chat Room” (to 
denote virtual reality aspect of dematerializaton) or world of “Equity and 
Sustainability”. An earlier catch phrase for this storyline was the “Dematerialization and 
Decarbonization” to denote rapid technological, institutional and social priority on 
environmental protection and sustainability as expressed by many stakeholder groups 
today. They portray the successful of sustainable development associated with the 
A1H&E storyline. The color image of this storyline might be green and down-to-Earth 
brown. 
 
 
6.1. B1H&E Characteristics 
 
The principal scenario driver is changing perceptions, attitudes and lifestyles, 
complemented by new models of international policy coordination and cooperation. 
Contrary to the prevailing trends towards consumerism and hedonistic lifestyles, “slow” 
and “smart” become the dominant metaphors for desirable lifestyles and technologies 
and are continuously critically evaluated and modified in view of a gradually evolving 
ideology of sustainability. While local and regional interpretations of sustainability 
vary, reflecting varied conditions, a widespread consensus on the imperative of 
sustainable development emerges across all societies and cultures. Sustainability fora 
and solidarity movements favoring the dis-privileged proliferate, enabled by rapidly 
expanding global communication networks and recast traditional “top-down” policy 
frameworks by “bottom-up” citizen movements. Talk is followed by action, initially 
based on grass-roots movements like NHI (No Hunger International) or HfA (Health for 
All), the objectives of which are increasingly adapted by national and international 
policy bodies translating into new models of international cooperation aiming at 
building the three pillars of sustainable development: eradication of poverty, social and 
economic equity, and environmental protection. 
  38
 
 
Dematerialization and Lifestyle Changes 
 
Innovation and productivity gains are increasingly invested no longer in increasing 
consumption of the affluent but rather in improved efficiency of resource use 
(“dematerialization”), economic equity, building of social institutions, and 
environmental protection. Approaches are pragmatic and results oriented aiming at 
reconciling man and nature, i.e. means and ends are “Down to Earth”. A strong welfare 
net prevents social exclusion on the basis of poverty within regions. An increasingly 
widespread social stigmatization of conspicuous consumption patterns results in rapidly 
changing lifestyles and increasing public support for stepped-up resource transfers from 
“rich” to “poor” also at the international level. Preservation and remediation become 
core themes of environmental governance, increasingly involving voluntary agreements, 
self-restraint, and “smart” technological solutions in addition to traditional command 
and control public policies. In a world of “global villages” values and lifestyles 
converge, whereas instruments (social and technological solutions) are increasingly 
varied to best reflect local circumstances. Harmony with nature and sustainable 
ecosystem services are a high policy priority reflected in individual and social values.  
 
Despite this globalization of values and lifestyles, the focus of everyday life 
increasingly revolves around local communities. Whereas ideas are exchanged globally 
through increasingly sophisticated and cheap communication means, social contacts 
remain firmly rooted in local communities. “Down to Earth” citizens communicate and 
think globally, but live and act locally. For many, long-distance travel to remote 
destinations looses its traditional appeal, at best being a once-in-a-lifetime experience. 
Effective communication systems lead to emergence of “virtual” travel. However, 
counter-currents may develop and in some places people may not conform to the main 
social and environmental intentions of the mainstream as described in this scenario. 
Massive income redistribution nationally and internationally and presumably high 
taxation levels may also adversely affect the economic efficiency and functioning of 
world markets. The paramount importance given to “appropriate” technologies may 
hinder in some places the diffusion of advanced technology concepts such as fuel cell 
cars that might be objected in favor of environmentally benign bicycles. The quest for 
“sustainability correctness” may provoke counter-reactions, e.g. in form of “spring 
breaks” of students traveling 10,000 kilometers to distant holiday destinations. But 
despite these counter-currents, the sustainability paradigm gets established firmly and 
“think slow” and “smart” increasingly replaces “think big” as desirable goals for the 
material culture of societies. 
 
Decentralization and Sustainability 
 
Particular efforts are devoted to increases in resource efficiency to achieve the 
sustainability goals stated above. Incentive systems, combined with advances in 
international institutions, permit the rapid diffusion of cleaner technology. To this end, 
R&D is also enhanced, together with education and the capacity building for clean and 
equitable development. Organizational measures are adopted to reduce material wastage 
by maximizing reuse and recycling. The combination of technical and organizational 
change yields high levels of material and energy saving, as well as reductions in 
pollution. Labor productivity also improves as a by-product of these efforts. Combined 
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with the quest for high quality of product and services this translates into high 
productivity gains and into hefty increases in high value added activities and products, 
yielding high economic growth. 
 
Accordingly, B1H&E storyline specifies more emphasis on decentralized energy 
conversion, distribution and energy end-use patterns. The world is also more urbanized 
than today but the patterns are assumed to be fundamentally different. They would be 
more consistent with widespread of urban sprawl into smaller settlements and 
communities. These are also interconnected through sophisticated infrastructures, but 
are fundamentally more autonomous and autarkical. The scenario places great emphasis 
on environmental protection at all scales, from local to global. It is representative of a 
successful implementation of sustainability together with a more equitable society. This 
implies that there is a substantial degree of income redistribution in space and time 
(another important maxim of the sustainability transition). As such, the scenario 
illustrates a complete paradigm change compared to current inequalities and 
environmental destruction. Another salient aspect of this scenario is the implicit change 
in lifestyle and social priorities. 
 
 
6.2. B1H&E: Key Drivers 
 
Population, economic development, and regional disparities 
 
The demographic transition to low mortality and fertility occurs rapidly; incidentally at 
the same rate as in high economic growth A1H&E storyline presented above, but for 
different reasons as it is motivated partly by social and environmental concerns. For 
instance, reducing the environmental “footprint” of humanity is increasingly stated as 
reason for low fertility levels. Sub-replacement fertility levels ranging between 1.3 to 
1.7 children per woman are a globally pervasive phenomenon. Global population 
reaches nine billion by 2050 and declines to about seven billion by 2100.  
 
B1H&E storyline describes a world with high levels of sustainability. The 
corresponding SRES B1 scenario family describes a development pattern in which 
global GDP would increase to some $50 Trillion by 2020, $140 Trillion by 2050, 
eventually multiplying by a factor close to 20 by the end of the 21st century (to some 
$350 Trillion). But nature of economic activities and especially its distribution are 
radically different from conventional high economic growth scenarios. High value 
added increasingly does not rely on resource consumption as a high proportion of 
income is spent on services rather than on material goods, and on quality rather than 
quantity. Personalized services, revival of (expensive) arts and craft custom-made 
objects, cultural activities all add high value to the “green” GDP, without however 
requiring large natural resource inputs. The economy and consumption patterns become 
increasingly dematerialized. The emphasis on material goods decreases as resource and 
waste disposal prices are increased by environmental taxation.  
 
Another important difference is in the more equitable income distribution, both 
domestically as well as internationally. Global income disparities when measured by per 
capita income differences between “North” and “South” were approximately 16:1 in 
1990 when incomes are compared at market exchange rates, and still a factor close to 6 
when incomes are compared at purchasing power parities. These income disparities are 
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significantly reduced in the “Down to Earth” scenario as a result of deliberate progress 
toward international and national income equality. North-South income disparities 
(expressed at market exchange rates) would be reduced to a factor of 4:1 by 2050 and a 
factor 3:1 by 2100 (and to a factor of 1.5 when incomes are compared at purchasing 
power parities). 
 
Social Trends and Governance 
 
As mentioned above, social change is the principle characteristic and main driver of this 
scenario. Trans-material values and lifestyles become a global phenomenon, but unlike 
the traditional Western consumerism model these new lifestyles emerge out of a 
multitude of sources and in a polycentric structure, drawing inspiration from a wide 
variety of experiences from religion, philosophy, as well as concrete life biographies 
from all over the world. From this perspective, the “slow” movement is different from 
the “green” movement of the 20th century and hence might find much wider adoption.  
 
The material culture of people is not necessarily frugal, as people continue to value 
highly their indoor and outdoor environments, albeit always emphasizing quality over 
quantity. Instead of “throw-away” products, longevity, repair capability, and perfect 
functional and artistic design become the dominant purchase criteria. Minimization of 
up-front expenditures (e.g. in housing) gives way to a systematic life-cycle economic 
perspective, fully considering externalities and placing paramount priority on 
environmental performance. With the exception of demonstrative, conspicuous 
consumption products such as luxury cars or private jets, which are considered 
undesirable, material consumption patterns allow for plenty of choice. Lifestyles 
emphasize ludique over social status via demonstrative consumption. Fashion designers, 
ebonists, even builders of wooden sailing boats are all professions that see a vigorous 
revival as consumer demands and lifestyles change. 
Also the spatial context in which people’s lifestyles take place changes significantly. 
Instead of spatially separated activities, collocation and “community” become important 
spatial foci of every day life, significantly promoting “soft” mobility and reducing long-
distance travel demand. The “think globally, act locally” philosophy is applied in a 
system of electronically interconnected “global villages”, in which both traditional rural 
and suburban villages coexist with “urban villages”, that have high population densities, 
but otherwise function economically and socially like traditional village communities (a 
contemporary example being Greenwich Village in New York). 
Governance structures are effective in this scenario at all levels from the local up to the 
global. They are participatory and pluralistic.  Regulatory modes are diverse and 
generally take considerable amount of time, coordination, and approval seeking, not at 
least because of the grassroots type nature of many social movements involved as 
stakeholders. However, whatever time is lost in the policy formulation process, is 
quickly gained subsequently by wide social “buy-in”, fast implementation and limited 
obstruction to regulatory rules. 
A distinguishing feature of B1H&E storyline (as well as similar scenarios portrayed in 
the scenario literature) is the emergence of effective international governance. 
Originally emerging out of the environmental field, global governance structures and 
institutions progressively extend their reach to include for instance, technology policy 
(R&D and standard setting), IP rights, education, even media control. These tendencies 
materialize first in highly concentrated sectors, such as aviation or the automobile 
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industry. For instance, the Global Aviation Advisory Board (GAAB) is instituted by a 
UN resolution in 2015 and as of 2020 sets global standards for the safety, fuel 
efficiency, and emission performance of all aircraft designed and operated. GAAB also 
has to power to “ban” outdated technological vintages, accelerating the turnover of 
capital stock and thus the diffusion of new types of aircraft. Yet, by 2050, 
environmental pressures, especially in connection to climate change trigger even stiffer 
regulation affecting also consumer choice through the introduction of air ticket quotas 
that are originally auctioned-off, but subsequently allocated on a per-capita basis. 
Another area of intense regulatory arrangements is personal mobility. Local and shorter 
distance individual travel is important because of the lower population densities and 
distributed settlement patterns. In many communities, the preference is for using 
bicycles and “collective taxis” instead of cars. However, advanced generation of 
hydrogen hybrid vehicles is increasingly used to distributed electricity and heat 
production. Cars are connected to individual houses. Their fuel cells and batteries help 
manage the load across local micro-grids. Houses are already close to zero-energy. Such 
elaborate systems for reducing material-intensiveness of the economy and emissions 
require widespread regulation and coordination in real-time. The regulatory frameworks 
are basically oriented toward “virtual” systems integration and re-bundling. 
Regulation deepens in all aspects concerning social equity and environmental 
protection. Even if benign in intent, the consequences of this “Big Sister” state are 
perceived by many as overly patronizing and jeopardizing civil liberties. Thus all 
governance institutions are continuously challenged and are in permanent need for 
justification and seeking wide stakeholder consensus. This is the necessary price to pay 
to get wide approval of the ambitious projects of international resource transfers 
(reaching up to five percent and more of GDP of the donor countries) being part of the 
global war on poverty or for the exorbitant carbon taxes introduced to combat climate 
change (rising from around $50-100 per ton carbon in 2010/2020 to some $2000 per ton 
towards the end of the 21st century). 
 
Environment and Ecology 
 
Given the high environmental consciousness and institutional effectiveness assumed for 
this scenario, environmental quality is high, as most potentially negative environmental 
aspects of rapid development are anticipated and effectively dealt with locally, 
nationally, and internationally. Clean local water and air are first policy priorities and an 
almost universal global provision is achieved by 2030. Transboundary air pollution 
(acid rain) is also basically eliminated in the long term. Land use is managed carefully 
to counteract the impacts of activities potentially damaging to the environment. Cities 
are compact and designed for public and non-motorized transport, with suburban 
developments tightly controlled. Strong incentives for low-input, low-impact 
agriculture, along with maintenance of large areas of wilderness, contribute to high food 
prices with much lower levels of meat consumption. Agricultural activates resemble 
more a “technogarden” in harmony with natural ecosystems. 
 
Overall, all negative impacts of an industrial society are at the focus of public and 
citizens attention. If technological solutions can solve the problem they are adopted, 
assuming they meet the criterion of local social appropriateness (e.g. zero-emission 
vehicles in industrialized countries). If no technological fix can be devised or the 
technological solutions are deemed insufficient (like for measures reducing aircraft 
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noise) the answer is a strict ban on activities or technologies deemed socially or 
environmentally undesirable.  
 
Box: Making Cheaper Hydrogen 
 
Hydrogen-powered fuel cells provide efficient, reliable and clean power for 
everything from buildings to vehicles and wireless devices in the A1H&E and 
B1H&E storylines. Today, about 6 EJ of energy are in the form of hydrogen 
worldwide, but most of this hydrogen is produced by steam reforming of methane. 
This is the cheapest way of obtaining hydrogen but it is much more expensive than 
other energy carriers such as electricity. Other, even more costly method of 
producing hydrogen is through electrolysis of water. First, electricity needs to be 
generated and than hydrogen, leading to both high costs and low conversion 
efficiencies. These practices are so expensive that many argue that hydrogen era is 
decades away. One method of reducing the costs of hydrogen in the hydricity age is 
by improving catalysts employed in many of the hydrogen-producing reactions. 
Common catalysts today include precious metals like gold and platinum. Some 
have even raised concerns that the future age of hydricity may transform the current 
dependence on oil to future dependence on precious metals. 
 
Recently, researchers at the University of Wisconsin-Madison have constructed a 
catalyst from nickel, aluminum, and tin that could be hundreds of times less 
expensive and still accelerate reactions involving production of hydrogen from 
methanol or biomass. These catalysts would provide for cooler reactions requiring 
much less energy compared to steam reforming today. This could conceivably make 
decentralized hydrogen energy cheap enough that commercial buildings, homes and 
cars cold have their own power supplies (Dizikes, 2004). 
 
One notable exception to this approach is in the efforts to combat7 climate change. 
Avoiding climate change impacts in promoting a vigorous move towards a carbon-free 
energy system is recognized to be feasible only over the long-term. Because of the 
pervasiveness of energy use activities the simplistic “ban away” approach is simply not 
feasible, requiring instead a whole host of positive and negative incentives in terms of 
R&D subsidies, clean technology and clean development funding as well as taxation of 
emissions, which are gradually, but persistently stepped up reaching $2000 per ton 
carbon. As a result, towards the end of the 21st century the task of phasing out fossil 
fuels is well underway and atmospheric concentrations of CO2 are stabilized at below 
450 ppmv. 
 
This kind of accelerated decarbonization of the energy system requires new 
development priorities and paradigms. This is why we assume a whole host of different 
policies and measures geared toward decarbonization. We do not assume a “single 
silver bullet” but rather a whole portfolio of policies that leads to a vigorous portfolio of 
mitigation measures.  
 
 
                                                 
7 This is a notable difference to the SRES-B1 scenario that assumed no explicit climate policies. It is more 
consistent with the Post-SRES B1-450 stabilization scenario and the B1T high-technology variant of the 
basic storyline. 
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Box: Photobiological Hydrogen and Green Algae as Source of Hydrogen 
 
Green algae have the unique ability to convert water and sun into hydrogen through 
the process of photosynthesis. Large-scale renewable hydrogen could be produced 
from mass cultures of (genetically) modified green algae. In principle, this could one 
day provide commercially viable source of renewable hydrogen. Assuming optimal 
conditions, it is conceivable that green algae could produce up to 20grams of 
hydrogen per m2 culture area per day. But this optimistic scenario cannot be realized 
with present day know-how. 
 
Other more advanced methods of direct photobiological hydrogen production are also 
being studied (NAE, 2004). Hydrogen production by direct oxidative cleavage of 
water, mediated by photosynthetic (micro)organisms, without biomass as 
intermediate, is an emerging technology at the early exploratory research stage 
(Gregoire-Padró, 2002). 
 
By circumventing biomass formation and subsequent 
gasification, the yield of solar energy conversion to hydrogen by direct 
photobiological processes is theoretically more efficient than is biomass gasification 
by 1 to 2 orders of magnitude. The direct photobiological hydrogen release could be 
on the order of 10 percent, compared with efficiencies of between 0.5 to 1 percent for 
biomass-to-hydrogen conversion. It is conceivable that bioengineering efforts on the 
light harvesting complex and reaction center chemistry could improve this efficiency 
several-fold over the coming decades, and thereby bring the overall efficiency (solar-
to-hydrogen) of direct photobiological hydrogen production into the range of 20-30 
percent. However, substantial, fundamental research needs to be undertaken before 
photobiological methods for large-scale hydrogen production are considered (NAE, 
2004). 
 
Resources and Technology 
 
With a few exceptions of environmentally critical raw materials, resource availability 
becomes progressively decoupled from geology and ecology. In other words, not 
geological availability determines resource availability, but rather social choice. Despite 
continued abundance of coal and unconventional oil, few deposits are explored and 
even fewer exploited as efforts concentrate to achieve a smooth transition to alternative 
energy systems.  
 
There is extensive use of conventional and unconventional gas as the cleanest fossil 
resource during the transition (also used as transitional fuel for cars, buses, and aircraft), 
but the major push is toward post-fossil technologies centering around the twin energy 
carriers electricity and hydrogen, driven in large part by environmental concerns. This 
hydricity transition is made the easier, because demand remains relatively low, 
reflecting pronounced dematerialization of economic activities, changing consumer 
choices, as well as high prices.  As a result global energy use only grows slowly, 
roughly doubling by 2050 and quadrupling by 2100 -- for an almost 20 times increase in 
the size of the global economy. Conservation and efficiency are the maxims of this 
future society. 
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Box: Utsira project 
A pioneering project on the island of Utsira in Norway envisages that ten 
households to be supplied first by wind electricity and eventually also hydrogen 
produced from wind power.  
Utsira is a remote, wind-swept island off the west coast of Norway. This small 
island community with 240 inhabitants is where one of the most innovative projects 
ever developed by Hydro of Norway and its partners will be tested. The basic idea 
is to provide fossil-free electricity and hydrogen on the whole island and thereby 
make it energy sufficient and virtually emissions free. 
Utsira is very windy so that the two wind turbines with installed capacity of 600 
kWe each can in principle produces power in excess of the community’s electricity 
demands. However, wind power is not necessarily available when needed and 
excess production during periods of strong wind would need to be wasted. To 
resolve this potential mismatch between supply and demand, Hydro has decided to 
store excess energy in the form of hydrogen. Electrolysis will be used to produce 
hydrogen for storage and a hydrogen internal combustion engines and a fuel cells 
will be used to convert the hydrogen back to electricity when needed. 
The unique aspect of the Utsira project is that its energy system will be virtually 
closed. The ten households will receive all their electricity from wind without 
backup generation or electricity imports. As the power consumption of the islanders 
varies, hydrogen will be either produced or the stored hydrogen will be converted 
back into electricity. Only once hydrogen storage is full the excess energy would be 
sold on the electricity market. 
The Ulisra project is one of the first decentralized “hydricity” system for a whole 
community. It is a precursor of the energy systems envisaged in the B1H&E 
storyline. 
Energy systems diversify out from the use of fossil fuels. By 2020 close to 20 percent of 
global energy supply are derived from zero-carbon energy sources, a share that 
increases to 30 percent by 2050 and well over 50 percent perhaps even 80 percent by 
2100 alleviating both pressures on depleteable resources as well as on the environment. 
Technologically, the scenario is characterized by high levels of technological 
development in the domains of material and energy saving, emissions control 
technology, as well as labor productivity.  The latter is essential to support the rapid 
growth in personal income, given that a major increase in labor force participation is 
implicit in the equity assumptions of rapid economic growth in the “South”. 
Technologies tend to be implemented in a pollution prevention mode, implying a much 
more highly integrated form of production than industry practices today.  
The traditional competitive model of technological innovation gives gradually way to 
elaborate schemes of informal and formal coordination of R&D activities. Overall, both 
public and private sector R&D expenditures are significantly stepped up (reaching up to 
5 percent and more of GDP), but increasingly targeted to environmentally desirable 
technologies in the domains of pollution prevention and environmental restoration but 
always being anxious about unintended side-effects. As a result, technology and risk 
assessment become dominant professions, not unlike lawyers in the contemporary US.  
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Box: Iceland's Road to Hydrogen Economy 
Hydrogen is being tested in many buses from Amsterdam to Vancouver as a clean 
source of energy to replace oil products and thereby reduce emissions. There are 
three fuel cell hydrogen buses operating in Reykjavik. “Sometimes I have to explain 
to passengers that it's just water vapor,” the driver said of white clouds trailing after 
his bus along the streets of Reykjavik. “When it's very cold there's a lot of white 
steam.” (Doyle, 2005) 
About 70 percent of Iceland’s energy is renewable from geothermal sources and 
hydropower. The only exception are road, air and water transport. Like everywhere 
transport depends on liquid oil products. Other important source of carbon 
emissions in Iceland is aluminum smelters. Even though the electricity is renewable 
and carbon free, the smelting process itself emits CO2. Thus transport and 
aluminum industry are the major source of carbon emissions. 
Some consider hydrogen as the future clean energy carrier of choice for Iceland. In 
conjunction with renewable sources of electricity, renewable sources of hydrogen 
would bring the hydricity age closer to home and would at the same time drastically 
reduce Iceland’s carbon emissions. To power the hydrogen buses, Iceland has 
installed a hydrogen gas station in Reykjavik. Hydrogen is produced through 
electrolysis of water. The only drawback is that the fuel thus produced is relatively 
expensive compared to the polluting alternative, the diesel. Iceland's buses, made by 
DaimlerChrysler, cost about €1.25 million each, or three to four times more than a 
diesel-powered bus, It takes about 6-10 minutes to refill a hydrogen bus, giving a 
range of 400 km. A further advantage of hydrogen busses is that they are far less 
noisy compared to their diesel counterparts.  
Furthermore the great Icelandic fishing fleet is a candidate for hydrogen production 
because it accounts for about 30 percent of the Icelandic oil imports. In the long run 
the whole public and private transport will be transferred to hydrogen produced on 
the basis of renewable primary energies (Hydrogen Mirror, 1998). 
Iceland is very vulnerable to climate change being located in the North Atlantic. 
Many consider further melting of glaciers a virtual certainty. This would release 
huge amounts of water that could be used to generate a lot of electricity. 
Unfortunately, electricity cannot be stored and is notoriously difficult to transport 
over large distances. Iceland itself is too small to be able to utilize so much 
electricity. A futuristic idea is to convert the electricity to hydrogen in the long term 
future and ship it to Europe or North America. This would make Iceland a net 
energy exporter and perhaps the first to offer large amounts of zero-carbon energy 
carriers on the world market. 
 
Communication and Transport 
 
Communication and transport act as substitutes especially after the emergence of full 
virtual reality (VR) personal communicators that manipulate and enhance brain 
functions for a perfect multimedia experience, including sound, vision, smell, tastes, and 
tactile experiences.  The phenomenal corresponding growth in bandwidth is managed 
via new carbon nanotube cables and ubiquitous satellite connections. These advanced 
information technologies achieve a global spread quickly, and are fully integrated into 
all economic and social activities. Much like the almost universal and 100 percent 
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adoption of mobile phones among the youngsters in Europe, VR personal 
communicators and their early precursors are globally adopted.  
 
Box: Diffusion Hydricity Vehicles 
Fuel cells and other hydrogen technologies are prohibitively expensive and have 
penetrated only a few specialized niches such as space shuttle, few stationary 
applications and experimental buses and cars. This is likely to continue to be the 
case during the coming decades. Assuming even an optimistic learning curve for the 
improvement of fuel cells (as illustrated in the figure, see Bos, 1995), it would be 
necessary to install many GW of fuel cell before their costs can come in the vicinity 
of internal combustion engines. First applications are likely to there where high 
costs might be acceptable such as on remote locations, in congested urban area. 
Another large market are mobile electronic devices or a new generation of “virtual 
assistants” that might integrated many of the current mobile devices from a 
telephone and a laptop to an electronic office. Ultimately, advanced micro, 
nanomachines and specialized robots might become dependent on hydricity as a 
source of energy in conjunction with fuel cells. These are many possibilities and 
potential niches for more widespread diffusion of fuel cells. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The largest market fuel cells are automobiles. There are some 700 million cars in 
the world. With installed capacity of say 70kW each, this corresponds to some 
50TW of installed capacity, well over ten times all power plants and other 
generating capacity taken together. Even with modest learning curves, such huge 
capacity will certainly drive costs down should fuel cells ever power vehicles. 
Fuel cell cars will most likely be of a hybrid type including some form of on board 
electricity storage. They would range from small vehicles including (fuel-
cell)cycles to buses. Applications are also potentially large in hydrogen aircraft to 
produce onboard electricity. 
 
The “global communication panel” report of 2050 identifies that out of the 9 billion 
people inhabiting the planet in 2050, less than 500,000 refuse the use of a VR 
communicator out of privacy concerns. Even the most critical technology luddists 
Source: Bos, 1995   
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embrace fully the increasingly wide range of advanced electronic communication 
technologies and infrastructures, as they epitomize dematerialization and “smart” use of 
resources. Electronic communication also provide for the only technological mean to 
cope with the complexities of participatory decision making processes. Cynics postulate 
a “law of constant voting time” of approximately two hours a day which many consider 
as taxing and ineffective. Conversely, electronic communication turns out to be quite 
effective in substituting for travel demand. As a result both travel time and money 
budgets get significantly reduced. 
 
Box: Distributed Systems Integration and Settlement Patterns 
 
Large potential synergies exist through systems integration and virtual coordination. 
Zero to very low energy houses provide an ideal integration environment for 
hydricity vehicles. This is especially the case in the B1H&E storyline because of 
low population densities. Cars could be integrated into the house to cogenerate heat 
and power locally from hydrogen (either distributed through pipelines or stored 
locally). Such cars would become a decentralized power systems both for 
production and (short-term) storage of electricity. This scheme would harmonize 
really well with renewable sources of hydricity, whether local photovoltaic and 
wind systems or direct hydrogen production through genetically engineered 
photosynthesis. Integrated house-car systems could both manage hydricity loads 
through generation, conversion of hydrogen to electricity (and vice versa) and 
through hydricity storage. Clearly, such systems would require virtual planning and 
real-time coordination (as a “distributed” grid). For example, the use of the 
hydricity vehicles would be connected with some kind of “opportunity” loss when 
disconnected from the virtual grid. As cars are not used most of the times, this is 
more a question of logistics and coordination. 
 
Transportation demand grows only slowly with air transport being the most hit by 
“Down to Earth” consumers. Walking (including jogging), bicycles and zero-emission 
vehicles are used locally with little need for very long distance travel. In the near-to 
medium term there remains some room for modest growth of long-distance mobility 
particularly in developing countries (perhaps a factor two growth to 2020 and a 
stabilization at that level to 2050), but over the long-term air transport volume declines 
in absolute amounts compared to present day levels. Other long-distance transport 
modes fare only somewhat better, especially when perceived as environmentally less 
obtrusive, such as conventional rail. Under a general “slow” movement philosophy the 
market potential for high-speed ground transportation (maglev’s) remains low: a few 
isolated lines are built in particularly dense urban corridors (Shinkansen, Beijing-
Shanghai, BosWash, Rio-Sao Paulo), but these remain isolated infrastructures and see 
no pervasive diffusion. Local transport modes emphasize “soft” mobility concepts by 
public transport and bicycles (many of them fuel cell powered) and by small fuel cell 
carts in suburban settings. Traditional cars survive only in truly rural areas, where they 
are either an integral part of the house (source of power and storage facility) or 
continuing to rely on gasoline for many decades, especially in developing countries. 
However, over the long-term virtually all rural vehicles become hydrogen powered, 
produced decentrally to avoid obtrusive large energy infrastructures.  
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7. Hydricity Energy System 
 
Improvement of human well being is the salient driving force leading towards the larger 
role of abundant, affordable, convenient, cleaner and more environmentally compatible 
energy services and the possible emergence of the “Hydricity Age”. Central to this 
strategic vision a world in which partnerships and alliances must be built with private 
and public stakeholders to mitigate the risks of climate change and to achieve 
sustainable development.  
 
During the last two centuries, global energy systems have transformed from a reliance 
on carbon intensive sources of energy such as coal to oil and more recently to natural 
gas. This has resulted in substantial decarbonization of global energy. Diffusion of 
electricity and energy gases was an essential towards pervasive decarbonization. The 
energy gases started with synthetic, manufactured gases, but exploration and production 
activities of the gas industry during the 20th century has enabled natural gas to become 
the fuel of choice (and thus contribute to the decarbonization of energy). Electricity has 
emerged as the other clean energy carrier of modern societies and a crucial part in 
provisioning of energy services from mobility to information. Enhanced 
decarbonization is indeed an important driving force for the further diffusion of 
electricity and hydrogen.. A larger role of hydrogen would be consistent with this trend 
as well as with the need to reduce the emissions of greenhouse gases that are associated 
with anthropogenic sources of climate change. Expanding the use of gas today and 
hydrogen tomorrow is the best response to the threat of climate change. 
 
Another driving force is the need for clean and affordable energy services. Access to 
affordable energy services is crucial for economic development with more than 1.3 
billion people living in poverty (with less than $1 per day) and with two billion without 
access. In general, a larger role of electricity and energy gases in developing countries 
would help towards meeting their needs for energy services and towards reducing 
adverse environmental impacts from indoor air pollution to regional acidification.  Asia, 
in particular, where the emerging markets of China and India between them account for 
a third of the world’s population, is expected to experience a surging need for clean and 
affordable energy services that can be provided by electricity and natural gas in the 
medium term and hydrogen in the long run. The two hydricity storylines give alternative 
roadmaps toward this long-term goal of adequate and affordable energy for all with 
close to zero greenhouse gas emissions. 
 
The need for energy services is inseparably linked with cities and their people.  Without 
addressing these connections, efforts at urban management and planning are destined to 
end up in failures.  Conversely, the structures of future cities and the dynamics of 
people’s lifestyles, have serious implications for energy systems. These are some of the 
findings of the two hydricity storylines, one envisages further urbanization leading large 
megacities and conglomerations of urban areas, while the other emphasizes smaller 
communities and decentralized settlement patterns. Both of the storylines indicate a 
further need for inter-disciplinary approach in assessing various dimensions of hydricity 
age and human well being spanning the fields of energy, urban planning, economy, 
technology, ecology and climate. The storylines hint at many facets of sustainability 
ranging from liberty, equity, identity and governance to issues of land scarcity, urban 
sprawl, habitat and species loss, traffic congestion, air and water quality and waste 
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disposal. They provide a potential diversity of solutions, one emphasizing more 
integrated and centralized solutions while other the decentralized and local ones. 
 
The diversity of development paths illustrated by the two storylines demonstrate that the 
provision of human needs should be tailored precisely to the unique characteristics of 
each particular location and environment. Even the global and integrated aspects of 
A1H&E storyline build on unique local and regional characteristics. The many 
important economic, environmental and societal dimensions of development and 
sustainability together with their global and local contexts provide a huge opportunity 
for the hydricity technologies in the two storylines. Clearly, the materialization of some 
of the tendencies spelled out in the two storylines are not autonomous as they depend on 
decisions which have not been made yet. They required dedicated and cumulative 
investments in human capacity, institutions, technology innovation and diffusion, and in 
infrastructures ranging from energy to human settlements. On the downside for the 
hydricity future, there are plenty of scenarios in the literature where hydrogen remains 
to be elusive energy carrier. Clearly, hydricity age is not a must but rather an 
opportunity towards a more sustainable future. 
 
The perceptions about hydrogen as an energy carrier have changed during the last 
decades. They range from overoptimistic hypes associated with early and rapid 
introduction of fuell cells to strong pessimism because of the high costs of hydrogen 
production, difficulties with storage and transport and most of all because like the 
electricity the need to produce hydrogen from different sources of energy. Potential 
energy sources for the hydricity age range from renewables and nuclear to fossils in 
conjunction with carbon capture and storage. Resource constraints are not imminent 
over a century scale and perhaps longer. For example, methane hydrates are so vast that 
they would render natural gas into a virtually inexhaustible source of energy. The 
concerns are more in the area of security, adequate investments and environmental 
burdens. 
 
A crucial challenge for the emergence of the hydricity age is to develop global and 
regional production and trade in hydricity generated from many diversified sources 
through dedicated investment in infrastructures. While technological improvements may 
reduce the capital investment levels required as anticipated in the two storylines, the 
ultimate decision in terms of energy mix will depend not only on prices but also 
stability of supply, energy security and environmental considerations. Asia is likely to 
become one of the major hydricity markets. 
 
The two storylines indicate the magnitude of the challenge for the transition toward the 
hydricity age to be very similar to that hundred years ago for the introduction of 
electricity. The opportunities and barriers for hydrogen and more generally hydricity 
appear to be very similar in the two scenarios. Hundred years ago, electricity generation 
was prohibitively expensive, less efficient than more direct use of coal (in steam engines 
as a prime mover or for heat), it required enormous investments in infrastructures and 
adoption of fundamentally new end-use devices. All of this is true today for hydrogen 
and hydricity. In the two storylines, the emergence of the hydricity age brings multiple 
benefits, from clean and zero-emissions energy carriers, to decarbonization and 
convenience. Storylines regimentally describe the convergence of some new 
technologies and services that might be enhanced or even made possible with hydricity. 
The same was true for electricity during the last century. It made new human activities 
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and energy services possible that were unattainable before. Computers and intercity 
trains cannot be powered directly by coal, nor can the modern services-oriented 
societies. Virtually all human activities depend today on the availability of affordable 
and reliable electricity virtually everywhere. In the two scenarios, hydricity services 
promote the convergence of nano, bioengineering, cogno and advanced information 
technologies into fundamentally new products and services. Hydricity economy holds 
the promise of containing carbon emissions and fully decarbonizing human activities 
and thus avoiding the potential dire consequences of climate change. 
 
The message of the two storylines for the energy industry and governments is for 
decisions to be clearly articulated to enable the selection and integration of energy 
infrastructure to proceed with confidence. However, this also implies huge investments 
required first for achieving more vigorous research and development and later for 
building new infrastructures and energy systems. These needs are estimated in many 
scenarios in the literature. The SRES scenarios result in infrastructural and energy 
investments of some $300 to 500 billion per year during the next 30 years, half of those 
being needed for expansion of distribution systems. Infrastructural investments also 
include storage facilities both for energy gases, electricity and for carbon. 
 
Stationary uses of energy gases for cooking or in fuel cells for electricity generation are 
important for many developing countries that do not have universal access to electricity 
today. Higher shares of natural gas as (public) transport fuel would be another priority 
as it can result in a substantial reduction of urban air pollution. Fulfillment of these large 
technology needs would require closer collaboration among many countries and close 
industry and public partnerships especially to develop energy infrastructures such as 
pipeline grids and to develop and deploy new energy technologies. Governments have 
the primary role in creating the necessary legal and regulatory conditions in the 
development of gas markets, especially in smaller customer markets, as well as for the 
quality and efficiency of the service that should be guaranteed. These are some of the 
shorter-term enabling developments that are a consistent with the long-term transition 
toward hydricity in the two storylines. 
 
Fuel cell technologies are considered to be an important and essential component of 
future energy systems in both storylines and would play an essential role in improving 
natural gas uses and beyond in conjunction with hydrogen. Fuel cells are a generic 
technology as there are many types, from low to high temperature, from mobile to 
stationary. What they have in common is modularity and the possibility of small-scale 
distributed generation of electricity and cogeneration of heat. This is a decisive 
advantage as it may lead to substantial cost buy-downs along learning curves and render 
this technology economical in coming years and decades. The challenge today is the 
high cost compared to other alternatives, such as the internal combustion engine for 
automobiles. For example, including fuel cells in newly built houses could meet the 
environmental objectives of reduced energy use and emissions, while providing an early 
market for a high cost product. However, it appears that no major technical 
breakthroughs are required before fuel cells can be introduced into the stationary energy 
sector – although a lot of engineering development and especially cost reduction will be 
necessary. In the automotive sector the challenges are perhaps greater, as transport is 
much more homogeneous than power or heat generation in terms of both fuel use (only 
gasoline or diesel in significant quantities) and the ubiquitous internal combustion 
engine. So the introduction of the fuel cell to meet environmental goal
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changes in fuel provision, and the simultaneous development of both fuel cells and 
infrastructure. Fuel cells are expected to be one of the core technologies for motor 
vehicles in the 21st century as an integral component of the hydricity age.  
 
In the meantime, the so-called bridge technologies, such as hybrids, compressed natural 
gas, bio-fuel, GTL and DME vehicles would diversify the fleet, help reduce emissions 
and provide enabling infrastructures for fuel cell vehicles with hydrogen propulsion in 
the very long term. Emissions free or close to emissions free vehicles will be required as 
mobility continues to increase during the century. The two storylines spell some of these 
salient developments in individual mobility. 
 
A larger role of energy gases and electricity in the two storylines means these two 
energy carriers would also account for an even higher share of global emissions of 
greenhouse gases and especially carbon dioxide. This means that some of the 
technologies for carbon capture and storage would need to be developed and deployed. 
Already today, carbon dioxide is separated and stored in a deep sea aquifer below the 
North Sea (Sleipner and Snowhit gas fields) and carbon dioxide serves as an agent for 
enhanced hydrocarbon recovery. However, very high levels of carbon taxes would also 
make carbon capture from coal more economical as well as the introduction of nuclear 
and renewable energy sources for conversion to hydricity. 
 
The amounts of carbon dioxide to be stored would be truly enormous, ranging from a 
few to perhaps even more than 500 GtC (billion tons of elemental carbon) cumulated by 
the end of the century. The potential storage capacity in underground aquifers, depleted 
oil and gas fields and underground coal mine seams are all large and would suffice for 
storing captured carbon. The exhausted oil and gas fields represent a particularly good 
medium for carbon dioxide burial and storage. At the same time, injection of CO2 can 
enable enhanced production of residual oil, gas and gas condensate. Oceans are today 
one of the largest carbon reservoirs and could potentially store vast amounts in the 
future, but this option is very controversial because of the uncertain environmental and 
ecological impacts. Humanity has changed global climate during the last two centuries 
so that we are already beyond the point where a new energy regime and transition is 
required. Carbon capture and storage in conjunction with renewables and possibly also 
nuclear energy could in principle reduce global carbon emissions to virtually zero. 
Hydrogen and electricity could become pollution-free and renewable energy carriers. 
Achieving a hydricity age has never been more urgent. 
 
Today, the economics of hydrogen as an energy carrier are unfavorable, primarily 
because the external costs associated with the impacts of climate change are not 
considered in the cost calculations. However, once these external costs are included, the 
situation might change significantly. This is an argument for why governments should 
play a greater role in providing the necessary frameworks and incentives. There has 
already been a move towards the experimental use of hydrogen in buses and other end-
use devices. Usually, natural gas is a source of hydrogen. Other possibilities have been 
tested as well. For example, in Iceland geothermal and hydropower are used to produce 
hydrogen. 
 
Today, methane steam reforming is the most economical route for hydrogen production. 
Industry has considerable experience with hydrogen production by methane reforming, 
which can be seen as the transition route to the hydricity age. Unfortunately, the 
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economic opportunities for carbon capture and storage are only possible on a large 
scale. Another challenge is how to make small-scale reforming technology cheap and 
reliable, especially for use in refueling stations or on board vehicles.  First steps in this 
direction already exist. Another possibility during the transition toward the hydricity age 
would be to mix hydrogen and methane (hythane), which would reduce carbon 
emissions to the atmosphere and would not require new pipeline and distribution grids. 
In the medium term, there would be an opportunity to develop small hydrogen 
distribution networks for stationary fuel cells producing heat and power, and refueling 
stations for hydrogen fuel cell vehicles. 
 
Central hydrogen production with steam reforming of methane in conjunction with 
carbon capture and storage and from intermittent renewable sources, such as wind and 
hydropower, and the development of hydrogen transmission and storage are expected 
only in the much longer term. Thus, there are many possible technological synergies 
between hydrocarbon energy sources (in conjunction with carbon capture and storage) 
and renewables as complementary sources of electricity and hydrogen. The gas and 
electric industry should participate in the development of such perspectives in order to 
better understand what this could mean in the future. 
 
All of the infrastructure and technology requirements imply high R&D needs. Some of 
these are not necessarily the highest priority for the more developed regions of the 
world, e.g., technologies for efficient conversion of biomass cellulose into energy gases. 
Public and private partnerships are essential for achieving these challenging 
development needs. The energy world is entering a fundamental transition that is 
characterized by liberalization of markets, an increasing need for safety and energy 
security, and concerns about climate change. At the same time, the demand for services 
is likely to double many times by the end of the century. The diffusion of new and 
advanced technologies is a corner stone of this transition. The highest technological 
priorities are concerned with the reduction of carbon dioxide emissions through carbon 
capture and storage, the production of hydrogen as an emissions-free energy carrier and 
the development of affordable renewable sources of energy, safe and proliferation-
resistant nuclear energy and vast unconventional resources of hydrocarbons such as the 
methane hydrate deposits. In contrast to these large technology and resource 
development needs are the declining public R&D efforts throughout the OECD 
countries and the ever increasing competitive pressures facing the natural gas industry 
that further reduce the availability of R&D efforts. Public and private partnerships for 
technology innovation are essential for paving the road toward the hydricity age. 
Further, governments should provide strong support for research and development (in 
technology but also in socio-economic disciplines), with fiscal and policy incentives for 
demonstration projects. Governments should not try to pick the “winners.” However, 
very clear policy objectives must be articulated so that appropriate technologies are 
chosen. This will require a vision of the future. Facilitating energy investments and 
promoting R&D are two of the major challenges on the road towards a hydricity age. 
 
For hydricity age to become a reality a whole host of new technologies needs to be 
developed and deployed at affordable prices. They would also need to be socially 
acceptable and safe.  
 
Finally, the vision of a hydricity age provides a perspective towards future zero 
emissions energy systems with universal access to energy services by all. 
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Appendix Ia: Overview of main scenario driving forces in 2020, 2050 and 2100. Numbers show the range across the seven scenario groups that constitute the four families. 
Units are given in the table. Source: Nakicenovic et al., 2000. 
   A1  A2  B1  B2 
 1990  A1C A1G A1 A1T       
Population (billion) 5.3            
  2020   7.4-7.6 7.4-7.6 7.2-7.6 7.4-7.6  7.5-8.2  7.4-7.6  7.6-7.8 
  2050   8.7 8.7 8.3-8.7 8.7  9.7-11.3  8.6-8.7  9.3-9.8 
  2100   7.0-7.1 7.0-7.1 7.0-7.7 7.0  12.0-15.1  6.9-7.1  10.3-10.4 
World GDP (1012 1990US$)  21            
  2020   53-57 53-57 48-61 52-57  38-45  46-57  41-51 
  2050   163-187 164-187 120-181 177-187  59-111  110-166  76-111 
  2100   522-550 525-550 340-536 519-550  197-249  328-350  199-255 
Income ratio IND (Annex-I) to  
DEV (Non-Annex-I) 
16.1            
  2020   6.2-7.5 6.2-7.5 5.2-9.2 5.7-6.4  9.0-12.3  5.3-10.7  7.5-12.1 
  2050   2.8 2.8 2.4-4.0 2.4-2.8  5.2-8.2  2.7-4.9  3.7-7.5 
  2100   1.5-1.6 1.5-1.6 1.5-1.7 1.6-1.7  2.7-6.3  1.4-1.9  2.0-3.6 
Final energy intensity (106J/US$)a 16.7            
  2020   8.8-9.3 8.5-9.4 8.1-12.0 7.6-8.7  9.3-12.4  6.7-11.6  8.5-11.8 
  2050   5.4-5.5 5.5-6.3 4.4-7.2 4.2-4.8  7.0-9.5  3.5-6.0  6.0-8.1 
  2100   2.6-3.2 3.0-3.2 1.6-3.3 1.8-2.3  4.4-7.3  1.4-2.7  3.7-4.6 
Primary energy (1018 J)a 351            
  2020   653-659 631-669 573-875 513-649  485-628  438-774  506-633 
  2050   1307-1384 1289-1495 968-1611 913-1213  679-1059  642-1090  679-966 
  2100   1988-2325 2059-2737 1002-2683 1255-2021  1304-1964  514-1157  846-1625 
Share of coal in primary energy 
(%)a 
24            
  2020   29-41 24-29 8-28 8-23  18-32  8-27  14-31 
  2050   34-56 13-33 3-42 2-12  24-47  2-37  10-49 
  2100   44-48 3-29 2-41 1-2  17-53  0-22  12-53 
Share of zero carbon in primary 
energy (%)a 
18            
  2020   13-19 12-20 9-26 17-22  8-20  7-22  7-18 
  2050   22-31 19-27 21-40 39-47  14-29  18-40  15-30 
  2100   42-47 31-38 27-75 64-85  28-37  33-70  22-50 
a 1990 values include non-commercial energy consistent with IPCC WGII SAR (Energy Primer) but with SRES accounting conventions.  Note, that ASF, MiniCAM, and 
IMAGE scenarios do not consider non-commercial renewable energy. Hence, these scenarios report lower energy use. 
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Appendix Ib: Overview of GHG, SO2 and ozone precursors emissions (standardized) in 2020, 2050 and 2100 and cumulative CO2 emissions from 1990 to 2100 broken down 
into energy and land-use sources. Numbers show the range across the seven scenario groups that constitute the four families. Units are given in the table. Source: Nakicenovic 
et al., 2000. 
 
   A1  A2  B1  B2 
 1990  A1C A1G A1 A1T       
Carbon dioxide, fossil fuels (GtC) 6.0            
  2020   11.0-14.3 10.7-13.1 8.7-14.7 8.4-10.0  7.9-11.3  7.8-13.2  8.5-11.5 
  2050   20.6-26.8 21.4-25.6 12.7-25.7 10.8-12.3  10.5-18.1  8.5-17.5  11.2-16.4 
  2100   27.7-36.8 30.3-30.8 12.9-18.4 4.3-9.1  17.6-33.4  3.3-13.2  9.3-23.1 
Carbon dioxide, land use (GtC) 1.1            
  2020   0.3-1.8 0.3-1.8 -0.8-1.6 0.3-1.7  0.1-3.0  -1.2-1.3  0.0-1.9 
  2050   0.0-0.9 0.0-0.8 0.0-1.0 -0.2-0.5  0.6-0.9  -0.7-0.8  -0.2-1.2 
  2100   -1.8-0.0 -2.1-0.0 -2.4-2.2 0.0-0.1  -0.1-2.0  -2.8-0.1  -1.7-1.5 
Cumulative carbon dioxide, fossil 
fuels (GtC) 
6.0            
  1990-2100   2079-2478 2128-2289 1220-1989 989-1051  1303-1860  794-1306  1033-1627 
Cumulative carbon dioxide,  land 
use (GtC) 
1.1            
  1990-2100   31-69 31-61 31-84 31-62  49-181  -22-84  4-153 
Cumulative carbon dioxide,  total 
(GtC) 
7.1            
  1990-2100   2127-2538 2178-2345 1301-2073 1049-1113  1352-1938  772-1390  1164-1686 
Sulfur dioxide, (MtS) 70.9            
  2020   88-134 60-101 62-117 60-101  66-105  52-112  48-101 
  2050   72-139 64-81 47-120 40-64  78-141  29-69  42-107 
  2100   27-83 27-41 26-71 20-27  60-93  11-25  33-48 
Methane, (MtCH4) 310            
  2020   415-479 416-471 400-444 415-466  354-493  377-430  384-469 
  2050   568-636 511-630 452-636 492-500  402-671  359-546  482-536 
  2100   392-693 289-735 289-640 274-291  549-1069  236-579  465-613 
Nitrous Oxide, (MTN2O-N) 6.7            
  2020   6.1-9.3 6.1-9.3 6.1-9.6 6.1-7.8  6.3-12.2  5.8-9.5  6.1-11.5 
  2050   6.3-14.4 6.4-14.5 6.3-14.3 6.1-6.7  6.8-13.9  5.6-14.8  6.3-13.2 
  2100   6.1-16.2 5.9-16.6 5.8-17.2 4.8-5.4  8.1-19.3  5.3-20.2  6.9-18.1 
 
